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ABSTRACT 
This thesis aims to investigate the role of national medicines agencies on the innovative scope 
and productivity of national pharmaceutical small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
through comparative case study of Norway and Sweden. Institutional theory and resource 
based view are used to investigate the influence of institutional forces and strategic resources 
on shaping the roles of the agencies. The findings indicate that both factors have influenced 
the roles of Swedish medical products agency (MPA) and Norwegian medicines agency 
(NOMA). MPA seems to have an innovation facilitation role whereas NOMA does not. 
However, the Norwegian SMEs within drug discovery and development seem to perform 
better regarding innovative scope. The innovative productivity among Norwegian 
biopharmaceutical SMEs also appears to be on the rise. It is suggested that control variables, 
such as governmental initiatives on funding and tax benefits, have stronger influence on 
innovative scope and productivity compared to the role of the national medicines agency. 
Norwegian SMEs regularly seek guidance at medicines agencies in other countries. It is 
discussed that NOMA can contribute to an even higher performance of Norwegian SMEs if 
the agency changes its role towards more innovation-orientation and acts as a supporting 
organization. The practical implications of this research for NOMA have been elaborated. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
CHMP: Committee for Human Medicinal Products 
CP: Centralised Procedure 
DG: Director General 
EEA: European Economic Area 
EMA: European Medicines Agency 
FDA: Food and Drug Administration 
HoD: Helse- og omsorgsdepartementet (Ministry of Health and Care services) 
IMI: Innovative Medicines Initiative 
ITF: Innovation Task Force 
LMI: Legemiddelindustrien (The Association of Pharmaceutical Industry in Norway)  
MA: Marketing Authorization 
MP: Medicinal Product  
MPA: Swedish Medical Products Agency  
NCE: New Chemical Entity 
NHD: Nærings- og Handelsdepartementet (Ministry of Trade and Industry) 
NOMA: Norwegian Medicines Agency 
RBV: Resource based view 
R&D: Research and Development 
SAWP: Scientific Advice Working Party 
SLK: Statens Legemiddelkontroll (Norwegian Medicines Control Authority; former 
organization prior to establishment of NOMA) 
SME: Small and Medium-sized Enterprise 
TLV: Tandvårds- och läkemedelsförmånsverket (Dental and Pharmaceutical Benefits Agency) 
VC: Venture capital 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The number of innovative medicines that reach the market has been more or less constant in 
the past 50 years despite the enormous increase in the research and development (R&D) 
expenditures in this research intensive industry (Munos 2009). Less than one percent of new 
drug candidates reach the market, and among those, only less than 20 percent generate profits 
(Pregelj et al. 2010). Furthermore, emerging technologies and complex global development 
programs and costs makes predictability a key issue in this industry (Ormarsdottir et al. 2008). 
This has attracted the attention of politicians and the regulatory authorities in the USA and 
Europe (Milne 2006) because there is still a rather large extent of unmet medical needs in the 
fields such as cancer, neuropsychiatric disorders (Kaitin and DiMasi 2011), infectious 
diseases (Norrby et al. 2005), paediatrics and rare diseases. 
Pharmaceutical business including the development of medicinal products (MPs) is global in 
nature; i.e. the main rule is that new MPs are aimed to be launched worldwide. For MP 
developers in Europe, normally the first markets to address are Europe and the USA because 
of the large size and high income of the population. The central authorities in charge of drug 
approvals are the European Medicines Agency (EMA) in Europe and the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) in the USA. In Europe there are also (one or several) national agencies 
in each of the European countries. The reason is that not all approvals or authorizations are 
centralized.  
EMA’s main responsibility is “the protection and promotion of public and animal health, 
through the evaluation and supervision of medicines for human and veterinary use”…“The 
Agency also plays a role in stimulating innovation and research in the pharmaceutical sector” 
(www.ema.europa.eu). In fact, one of the main reasons for establishment of EMA was to 
assist innovative biotechnology reach a wider market (Ormarsdottir et al. 2008). 
Today, most new and innovative MPs are assessed and authorized through EMA and 
centralised procedure (CP). A CP approval means that the MP will be granted marketing 
authorization (MA) in all EU/EEA countries upon application from the company. EMA has at 
its disposal the pool of experts and scientists from all EU/EEA medicines agencies in order to 
assess applications for approval of new MPs. The evaluation of CP products is done by the 
scientific committees that are composed of members from each of the 27 EU countries plus 
Norway and Iceland. Experts from two of the above countries are appointed to independently 
assess each application and lead the scientific discussions in the relevant committees.  
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Before the establishment of EMA in 1995, pharmaceutical industry had to deal with 
regulators in all the European countries in which it aimed to place its MP on the market. This 
was ineffective and time-consuming. Centralized and decentralized procedures as well as 
several committees and working parties existed also before 1995, but their decisions were not 
legally binding. The shortcomings of European national regulatory frameworks were 
addressed through the establishment of EMA in that a coherent framework was founded to 
safeguard the public health in the European Union (Bauschke 2011). As explained above, 
national agencies in Europe turned into a network of regulatory experts to collaborate on 
approvals of new MPs. Accordingly, the success of the EU pharmaceutical regulations system 
and EMA lies in the fact that the member states have a real influence on the decision-making 
for regulatory policies (Krapohl 2004). 
Pharmaceutical industry has long been known as profit-maximizing, especially Big Pharma. 
There are many examples of MP development based on minor modifications to already 
existing MPs, which do not result in significant therapeutic improvements. This is in contrast 
to the society’s need for new therapies for life-threatening diseases such as infectious diseases 
caused by resistant microorganisms or cancer. Moreover, innovative pharmaceutical industry 
has traditionally been one of the most important industries in many European countries 
strongly contributing to the national economics. In the recent years, there has been a tendency 
that groundbreaking technologies are increasingly being developed by start-up firms (Danzon 
et al. 2005), so-called small and medium size enterprises (SMEs). Since SMEs commonly 
lack expertise and resources that Big Pharma has, they are more prone to making wrong 
regulatory decisions. As a rule SMEs require more scientific and regulatory guidance to 
succeed. All these facts have drawn the attention of the (European) authorities who have 
recognized the industry’s need for advice and risk-sharing (Antonanzas et al. 2011).   
In order to rapidly bring new therapies for major diseases to the market, European authorities 
have established a number of initiatives such as Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI), 
Innovation Task Force (ITF), the SME office, giving Scientific Advice for the development of 
innovative medicines, arranging Briefing meetings for informal exchange of information and 
guidance. All this is to address the predictability issue in MP development. EMA is 
responsible for the majority of the above mentioned initiatives and uses the experts in the 
national agencies for all such scientific activities including advising the innovators. When the 
expertise of the national agencies is being used in the regulatory and scientific activities 
across Europe, one might expect that national institutions and policies exploit such resources 
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for the benefit of national industry. However, the role of national medicines agencies in 
facilitating pharmaceutical innovation in their own countries has not been addressed in the 
literature. 
The only aspect of the national authorities’ contribution to innovation addressed in the 
literature is pricing and reimbursement strategies, both of which are nationally regulated 
(Lopez-Casasnovas 2008; Van Wilder et al. 2010). Reimbursement is a key factor to the 
success of innovative MPs in Europe, where healthcare is publicly financed. If national 
authorities decide not to reimburse a MP, its use will be restricted to the patients willing to 
pay for the treatment.  Such MP will not be widely used in that country and the applicant 
probably will not be willing to launch it there. Also, if the granted price by the authorities is 
too low, the applicant might not launch the MP in that specific country. 
There is a plethora of literature focusing on regulation of medicines in the EU leading to more 
rapid approvals (Mossialos et al. 2004; Milne 2006). Although quite useful, none of the above 
activities have so far resulted in a significant improvement of the situation in terms of more 
innovative therapeutics in the market (Munos 2009). However, such initiatives are expected to 
give results in the long-term. In fact, 35 new drugs (with new molecular entities) were 
approved by the FDA in 2011, which was a 7-year-high result. The numbers between 2006 
and 2010 varied between 18 and 26 (www.fda.gov).  
Given the ever growing complexity of new MPs, there is little doubt that the state 
organizations and regulatory authorities play an important role on innovation (Ormarsdottir et 
al. 2008). Recent studies on innovation models suggest that research and innovation are not 
confined to the firm any more but take place in the interrelationship between the actors: 
academia, state and industry (Giesecke 2000). The concerns about patient safety must always 
stay as the number one responsibility of regulators. However, this must not hinder their 
involvement in bringing the new and life saving MPs to the market for the benefit of the 
patients. 
1.1 Research problem  
The biotech landscape in Norway has been flourishing recently. In the 10 year period of 1995-
2005, the number of Norwegian innovative start-up pharmaceutical companies increased by 
11.4% (LMI 2007). A search of NorBiobase (Innovation Norway’s database on Norwegian 
biotech and medical technology companies) in 2012 with the keyword “Biomedical” resulted 
in 96 hits, the majority are SMEs. Such SMEs have limited resources, both human and capital, 
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and need support from the state and supporting organizations to survive and grow. Hence, the 
focus of the current study will be on pharmaceutical SMEs. 
Since the drug scandals in 1960s, the most famous being the Thalidomide scandal (Bauschke 
2011), the main task of the authorities regulating medicinal products was defined as ensuring 
that the new drugs that enter the market were safe. This has resulted in that pharmaceutical 
sector has become one of the most strictly regulated industries. The emphasis of the 
regulations has been placed on thorough assessment of the detailed documentation provided 
by the applicant, as well as inspection of the production facilities and laboratory control of 
finished products. In other words, “control” is the key word that summarizes how this sector 
has been and currently is regulated. 
As mentioned earlier, with establishment of the EU network and EMA, the authorities have 
also become responsible for innovation facilitation and stimulation. The question is: In this 
truly centralized system regulating the medicinal products in Europe, what role can a national 
agency play to promote or facilitate the innovation for the national SMEs? Innovation is 
multifaceted and in this study the focus will be placed on innovative productivity and 
innovative scope (described in section 3) which are important aspects of MP development. 
From a regulatory perspective, pharmaceutical innovative scope is of utmost importance due 
to the society’s need of new and breakthrough treatments. Consequently, for the comparison 
of innovative scope at SMEs between the two countries, only pharmaceutical SMEs within 
drug discovery and development are analysed since they contribute most to new treatments. 
Some national authorities such as Swedish Medical Products Agency (MPA) have long been 
active in giving guidance to pharmaceutical firms through all phases of drug development. 
This rather large organization (687 employees in the beginning of 2012) has a national 
scientific advice procedure which resembles the EMA’s procedure. In 2010 and 2011 they 
held 218 and 192 such meetings, respectively (MPA 2011). Other authorities such as 
Denmark’s regulatory authorities participate in a network of public-private researchers and 
stakeholders called Biopeople.  
Norwegian Medicines Agency (NOMA) is not involved in any such activities. Norway, as 
opposed to both Sweden and Denmark, has never had a truly innovative national Big Pharma 
either, which may point to the lack of competencies and resources as one explanation to why 
NOMA has not been more active in the scientific arena. NOMA is a rather small agency with 
approximately 240 employees (229 in permanent positions) in 2012. 
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There seems to be a clear difference between the roles of MPA and NOMA as the regulatory 
agencies, although both have the aim of protecting public health. MPA has apparently 
selected an innovation facilitation strategy while NOMA seems to mostly focus on the 
traditional controlling aspect of the regulation. This research will try to shed a light on the 
effect of such different national regulatory strategies and roles on the scope of innovation and 
innovative productivity within the SME segment in these two countries.  
The study will use institutional theory and resource based theory (also called resource based 
view or RBV) to address the following questions: Does the national institutional environment, 
reflected in the roles that the agencies have taken, influence the innovative productivity and 
scope at pharmaceutical SMEs? Is it the regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive aspects 
of the institution that dictates the role of the agencies, or is it the strategic resources and 
competencies that the agency is in the possession of, or is it both? Is there any interplay 
between the institution and the strategic resources?  
1.2 Research question 
The main objective of the research is to better understand the role of national medicines 
agencies in promoting innovation within the national (bio) pharmaceutical SMEs, by studying 
the case of Norway and Sweden.  
The main research question to be addressed is: 
a. What role do national medicines agencies play in promoting the innovative scope and 
productivity of the pharmaceutical innovation performed by SMEs in their own 
countries? 
a. How can national medicines agencies facilitate and contribute to (bio) 
pharmaceutical innovation in terms of innovative productivity and scope?   
b. How does the institutional environment of the national medicines agency 
influence its role? 
c. What strategic resources at national medicines agencies are important in 
facilitating innovation? 
d. What other factors in the national innovation environment contribute to the 
innovative productivity and scope of SMEs? 
Chapter 2 will elaborate the theoretical framework of the study, followed by the description of 
the methodology in chapter 3. The case study method is used for this investigation. The 
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method is qualitative and is based on primary and secondary data. The case study results are 
presented in chapter 4 leading to the discussion of the findings and modification of the 
theoretical model and propositions in chapter 5. Practical implications of the outcome of the 
study will also be highlighted in chapter 5 as well as the limitations of the current study and 
suggestions for future research. Finally, chapter 6 outlines conclusions by addressing the 
answers to the research question(s).  
2. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
2.1 Institutional theory and resource based view 
In this study we use institutional theory and resource based view (RBV) to understand the role 
of national medicines agencies in general and with respect to facilitation of innovative 
productivity and scope in SMEs. 
According to neo-institutionalism, “Institutions are comprised of regulative, normative, and 
cultural-cognitive elements that, together with associated activities and resources, provide 
stability and meaning to social life” (Scott 2008, pp. 48). Institutions are beyond the 
organization’s boundaries. They reduce risk and decrease the level of uncertainty by defining 
rules and expectations (van Waarden 2001). 
The regulative aspects of institutions normally take the form of regulations and politics, 
guiding the organizations by law enforcement and threat of legal sanctions (Hoffman 1999). 
The normative pillar includes both values and norms defining how things should be done 
through setting standards (Scott 2008). Hence this pillar defines not only the goals but also 
how to achieve them (Veciana and Urbano 2008). The cultural-cognitive pillar is 
subconscious. It includes symbols, (body) language, cultural rules and frameworks that guide 
one to understand the nature of reality, the basis of which becomes unquestioned (Hoffman 
1999). 
RBV has been developed to address one of the central questions in the field of strategic 
management: Why do some firms persistently outperform others? This theory suggests that 
the resource profile of a firm and how well this is recognized and applied by the firm are 
important factors leading to competitive advantage (Barney and Clark 2007). However, not all 
competitive advantages are permanent. To create sustained competitive advantage, the 
resources must be Valuable, Rare, Inimitable and exploited by the Organization, so-called 
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VRIO resources (Barney 1995). The resources that contribute to sustained competitive 
advantage of a firm are called strategic resources. 
Institutional theory is based on the firms’ tendencies toward conformity leading to 
homogeneity in their structures and activities. According to this theory successful firms are 
those who have conformed to social pressures. This is in contrast to the RBV that considers 
firm heterogeneity regarding resources and capabilities as the main reason for sustained 
competitive advantage and hence its success (Oliver 1997).  
In the present study, institutional theory will be used at two levels: to explore the forces that 
the national medicines agencies apply to the innovative SMEs and to investigate how the 
entire institutional environment of MPA and NOMA has shaped their roles regarding 
innovation facilitation. RBV will be utilized to investigate if the available resources in terms 
of competencies and capabilities in these two national agencies can explain the difference in 
the roles these agencies have taken. RBV is also touched upon to elaborate the role of 
agencies in knowledge spillover. 
 
2.2 Development of propositions 
2.2.1 Influence of the role of medicines agencies on SMEs’ innovation 
The institutional environment, particularly regulative and normative institutional forces seem 
to play a major role in influencing all activities in the pharmaceutical industry including 
innovation.  
All stages of product development, production, approval and post-approval changes are 
subject to regulations and inspections. Depending on the level of severity, any lack of 
conformity is followed up for corrective actions or will result in withdrawal of the product 
from the market. This represents the regulative institution. 
Important normative forces of the institutional environment on the pharmaceutical industry 
are represented by the construction of standards and guidelines for product development. 
Although not legally binding, guidelines are sufficiently detailed to describe the expectations 
of regulators regarding different aspects of pharmaceutical regulations. National medicines 
agencies, including NOMA and MPA, actively participate in the development of those 
standards and guidelines. Due to complexity of the field, numerous guidelines have been 
developed. The challenge of pharmaceutical industry and the regulators lies in interpretation 
10 
 
of relevant guidelines in each single case. The task of the regulators regarding innovation 
facilitation is to help the developers interpret those guidelines correctly from early on.    
Many authors have studied the influence of the institutional forces on innovative productivity 
and scope within pharmaceutical sector. FDA’s initiatives to apply new scientific tools in 
order to facilitate drug development as well as the agency’s initiative on a number of public-
private projects to reduce the uncertainty have been reviewed (Woodcock and Woosley 2008). 
Another group recommended more regulatory involvement to promote therapeutic advances 
within pharmaceutical innovation and to oversee the safety aspects of new MPs that are 
developed by utilization of new scientific tools (Abraham and Davis 2007). The importance of 
“users” in pharmaceutical innovation has also been addressed (Smits and Boon 2008), 
pointing at the increasing knowledge among the patients and the costs-conscious buyers 
(insurance companies or the state) who demand higher added-value products.  
In the present study we address the influence of the role of the national medicines agencies, 
particularly through regulative and normative pressure, on national pharmaceutical SMEs, and 
how this affects the innovative productivity and innovative scope of products developed by 
those SMEs.  
From the RBV perspective, it can be argued that national medicines agencies might play an 
important role in innovation due to knowledge spillover. The concept of knowledge spillover 
through being a part of a network (Dyer and Hatch 2006) is considered to be one of the 
important factors to improve innovative productivity (Ahuja et al. 2008). Supporting 
organizations are shown to have a significant role in innovation through knowledge spillover 
(Xavier Molina-Morales and Teresa Martínez-Fernández 2011). Supporting organizations are 
defined as public or private organizations (academia, research institutes, etc.) that interact 
with different firms and try to solve various forms of challenges, hence linking the firms and 
clusters together via what is called a “hyper-network” (Biggiero 1999).  
With respect to pharmaceutical innovation, both the innovative scope and the innovative 
productivity are highly important to the regulators; i.e. new treatments for serious diseases 
will reach the patients faster. At the same time new and breakthrough innovations are more 
risky and uncertain than incremental innovations, demanding higher extent of assistance from 
supporting organisations to develop effective strategies (van Waarden 2001). Consequently, 
when society needs entirely new treatments, public organizations including national medicines 
agencies have a responsibility to support that kind of innovation. 
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A SME’s success depends on the regulatory and scientific advice it receives and it is not 
unusual that a SME seeks advice from several national medicines agencies in different 
countries in addition to EMA in order to check the grounds. Provision of guidance to SMEs 
requires high level of competence and experience from national medicines agencies. In 
today’s complex European structure of regulation, a national agency is exposed to the national, 
the European and the international actors, both to the Big Pharma projects and the SME 
projects. The more the agency is involved in such projects, the better it will be prepared to be 
the link that connects the knowledge and challenges of those different actors. As a 
consequence, when a national medicines agency takes an innovation facilitation role, such as 
MPA does, it acts as a supporting organization. Therefore, it is expected that MPA exhibits 
stronger positive effect on the innovative productivity and scope of the national SMEs 
compared to NOMA.  
Proposition 1: A national medicines agency’s active role in innovation facilitation will 
result in higher levels of innovative productivity and scope among national pharmaceutical 
SMEs. 
 
2.2.2 Influence of institutional forces on the role of national medicines agencies  
National medicines agencies are a part of a complex drug regulatory institutional framework. 
As a result, their tasks and roles are also subject to institutional forces. 
Studies relating to institutional pressures on government agencies are seldom since those 
agencies are considered to be actors and creators of institutionalization rather than being 
affected by these forces. One of the few studies (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz 2004) suggested 
that governmental organizations are more responsive to all three aspects of institutional forces 
compared to profit and non-profit organizations. There seems to be two important reasons for 
this. One is the inaccuracy of measuring the performance of governmental agencies, forcing 
them to rely on external references to seek legitimacy. The second reason is their financial 
dependency on the state treasury and on ministerial cabinets for deciding on their direction 
and scope of operation and the fact that they compete with other public sector organizations to 
get larger portion of the state’s total budget (Matthews and Shulman 2005).  
With regards to funding, NOMA is a typical public sector organization, whereas MPA is more 
like a non-profit organization since it is self-financed. Accordingly, it may be expected that 
NOMA’s role is more influenced by the national institutional environment and policies. 
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As described earlier, in Europe, rules, regulations and norms regarding innovation and product 
development in the pharmaceutical industry are defined and decided on the European level. 
Both Dyrdal (Dyrdal 2004) and Vestlund (Vestlund 2009) who studied the adaptation of the 
national medicines agencies in Norway (and Sweden in case of Dyrdal) to the 
Europeanization emphasize the importance of both national institutions and affiliation to the 
EU on this process. How the EU regulations and norms are being translated in each country is 
a matter of national institutional forces and how well those are aligned with the EU 
institutional laws and norms; i.e. it is more likely that the national and EU forces match better 
when the country is a member of EU, such as the case of Sweden and MPA. Krapohl (Krapohl 
2004) argues that problems arise when the interests of the national authorities contradict with 
the EU policies. In the case of pharmaceuticals, the national institutional environment is 
particularly influential in the nationally regulated aspects, e.g. price and reimbursement 
strategy in Norway. 
In summary, it can be expected that the different roles of MPA and NOMA regarding 
innovation facilitation is because they experience different levels of pressure from the EU and 
the national institutional environment. There are two main reasons for that: a) Sweden is an 
EU member and Norway is not, and b) NOMA’s budget is provided by the government 
whereas MPA is self-financed. 
Proposition 2: Institutional forces at both the European and national level will influence 
the role of national medicines agencies with respect to innovation facilitation. 
 
2.2.3 Influence of strategic resources on the role of the national agencies 
RBV seems to be a suitable tool to study strategic resources of an organization. According to 
RBV, one of the most important managerial tasks is to understand the link between a firm’s 
resources and its sustained competitive advantage. Sustained competitive advantage is very 
important for the success of firms in the private sector since optimal use of available resources 
will ultimately benefit the firm itself in terms of value creation. For the public sector, however, 
this has been argued to  represent a paradox (Matthews and Shulman 2005). Public sector 
organizations are created to deliver service for the benefit of the society, e.g. create 
knowledge and services to develop an industry. The authors suggested that public sector can 
benefit from developing sustained competitive advantage only in cases where the organization 
is not exposed to extreme competition in terms of governmental financing. Another study 
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(Carmeli and Tishler 2004) showed that local government authorities in possession of 
strategic human capital which was highly educated and had organization-specific 
competencies and experience that was not easy to imitate exhibited a better financial 
performance than those authorities without such valuable resources.  
RBV also emphasizes on the importance of the particular time and space in the history of an 
organization in building sustained competitive advantage through acquiring and exploiting its 
resources (Barney and Clark 2007).  
As described in section 2.1, strategic resources according to RBV can be defined as the VRIO 
resources that provide the organization with sustained competitive advantage. In this study, 
strategic resources address both the available expertise in the national medicines agencies and 
the managerial capabilities to recognize and exploit the expertise in building competitive 
advantages. Did the people in the two organizations have influence on the ultimate role of the 
agency? 
Upon establishment of EMA, MPA decided to be very active in the scientific evaluation of 
MPs and to become one of the preferred authorities in the EU in this respect. MPA also 
decided to get more involved in the entire development stages of the products and actively 
give advice to the firms. It is likely that the architects behind such ambitious goals regarding 
scientific activities were the management of MPA, who not only had the right people and 
competences in the organization, but also recognized their potential and took advantage of the 
time window of opportunity for building the sustained competitive advantage. Parallel to this, 
it is possible that NOMA did not have the same level of scientific competence at hand at that 
time, or leaders to recognize their potential, to be able to resist the traditional controlling role. 
Proposition 3a: The type and level of competence of the strategic human resources at the 
national medicines agency will influence the role of the agency with respect to innovation 
facilitation. 
Proposition 3b: The ability of the management to recognize the organization’s resources 
and capabilities and to take advantage of the time window of opportunity for building 
sustained competitive advantage at the national medicines agency will influence the role of 
the agency with respect to innovation facilitation. 
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2.3 Summary of the theoretical framework 
Based on the propositions, the framework of the study can be summarized as follows: 
The dependent variables are the innovative scope and the innovative productivity for 
national SMEs in Norway and Sweden. 
The independent variable is the role of the national medicines agencies in relation to the 
SMEs. It is proposed that the active role of an agency as innovation facilitator will have 
positive influence on the innovative productivity and scope in the national pharmaceutical 
SME segment. 
The control variables are all national influential factors other than the pharmaceutical 
regulatory forces, which are thought to have a direct impact on the innovative scope and 
productivity of SMEs. Since the purpose of this study is to understand the role of the national 
medicines agency on innovative productivity and scope, factors which might have a direct 
impact on SMEs innovation activity are controlled for. These include funding (both 
government and private), tax regulations, patent laws, scientific environment, clusters and 
networks, R&D level and expenditure in the country, entrepreneurial spirit and capabilities, 
etc. Such factors do have a major impact on the success of a start-up firm and building up an 
industry.  
The theoretical framework is presented in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1- Schematic representation of the theoretical framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Role of the national 
medicines agency 
Innovative 
scope 
Innovative 
productivity 
Strategic 
resources  
Control 
variables Institutional 
environment 
P1 
P2 
P3a 
P3b 
 
15 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Case study methodology 
The study is explorative and follows an inductive approach. It is qualitative in nature and 
comprises embedded case studies comparing the case of Norway to the case of Sweden. The 
term embedded means that both the regulatory part and the innovative industry part are 
analysed. The analysis includes both primary and secondary data as explained bellow. It is 
believed that using multiple source of evidence, also called data triangulation, will minimize 
any error. Yin’s method for the case study research is applied (Yin 2009). The cases are an 
example of polar types (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007); i.e. two extreme cases of Norway 
and Sweden regarding the role of the national medicines agencies in facilitating innovation.  
 
3.2 Dependent variables  
3.2.1 Definition of SME  
The definition of SME according to EMA/EU Commission recommendations 2003/361/EC is 
summarized bellow (ema.europa.eu /SME office): 
Table 1- Definition of SME according to EMA 
Enterprise 
category 
Headcount: Annual 
work unit 
Annual turnover OR Annual balance  
sheet total 
Medium-sized < 250 ≤ €50 mill OR ≤ €43 mill 
Small < 50 ≤ €10 mill OR ≤ €10 mill 
Micro < 10 ≤ €2 mill OR ≤ €2 mill 
 
In the present study we defined SMEs only by the number of employees / headcounts 
according to the above table.  
3.2.2 Innovative scope 
Innovative scope refers to radical (or breakthrough) innovation as opposed to incremental 
innovation (Sorescu et al. 2003). Radical/breakthrough innovation in this study means an 
innovation which is major in scope and creates an entirely new product (Koberg et al. 2003). 
In comparison, an incremental innovation has lower impact (Koberg et al. 2003); it is rather 
an improvement to the existing technology (Garcia and Calantone 2002). 
An inherent characteristic of a radical innovation is the high level of risk and uncertainty 
(Baba and Walsh 2010), which necessitates firm strategies and supportive institutions that can 
reduce the risk. The risk is high both in the development stage and in the market introduction 
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stage; i.e. will this innovation ever end up in the market and even if it does, to what extent will 
it be adopted? (Sorescu et al. 2003).  
In terms of innovative scope of MPs, a radical innovation may be attributed to a product with 
a whole new mechanism of action, a NCE/new biological product or a new treatment for a 
neglected disease (orphan drugs). One way to operationalize this is to use FDA’s definition of 
which products are given priority review by this authority (Wildson and Nitsche 2004). FDA 
gives priority to review/assess applications based on significant improvements, defined as 
“drugs that offer major advances in treatment, or provide a treatment where no adequate 
therapy exists” (www.fda.gov). Priority review is done faster than standard review (six 
months as opposed to ten months). Annual FDA reports of the drug approvals are public and 
indicate the new MPs with priority review. This list, however, seldom reveals the name of the 
SME that started developing the product since at the stage of approval the MP is normally out 
licensed to other larger firms. 
 Norbiobase, Scandinavian life science database and Vinnova’s 2011 list of life science 
companies in Sweden were used to extract all the SMEs in Norway and Sweden which are 
involved in drug discovery and development; i.e. new chemical entities (NCE) or new 
biological products. The mentioned databases as well as the SMEs’ websites were used to 
identify those with a pipeline of products in the preclinical/clinical phases or lead 
identification/optimization (the research activities to select and optimize a drug candidate for 
development), as well as the number of the products in that pipeline. See appendix A for the 
list of the SMEs included in this analysis. 
When the SME had products on the market, it was checked if the product was a NCE / new 
biologic product and if so, was it approved under the Orphan drug regulation or had received 
a priority review from the FDA. Both the FDA annual lists for the past 5 years and the SMEs’ 
websites were used to extract this information. The combination of a new NCE / biological 
product and orphan/priority review status was defined as breakthrough or radical innovation.  
3.2.3 Innovative productivity 
Innovative productivity or innovative output is the result of innovative input or research 
(Ahuja et al. 2008). Light (Light 2009) has defined the pharmaceutical productivity as the 
number of new compounds that successfully complete the clinical trials. Usually it is not 
possible to define beforehand which line of input/research will be productive. However, the 
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larger number of “input” projects directly improves the chances for the larger number of 
“output” or results.  
Pharmaceutical drug development is a complex and lengthy process. All new chemical 
entities and new biological products have to show their quality, safety and efficacy through 
preclinical phase and 3 clinical phases before approval and launch (Figure 2).  
Figure 2- Scheme of pre-approval R&D process in pharmaceutical industry 
 
The purpose for each of the development phases is clearly defined: preclinical studies are 
aimed to make sure the drug is safe enough to be tested in humans, clinical phase I (Ph I) is 
primarily focused on ensuring non-toxicity in humans, clinical phase II (Ph II) is the proof of 
concept and establishment of optimal dose, clinical phase III (Ph III) is large studies aimed at 
establishment of benefit-risk ratio (does the effect of the product outweigh the side-effects?) 
through testing the product on large number of patients as well as comparison to other 
products on the market. There is a high attrition rate between the phases, meaning that a drug 
candidate’s chances for success (receiving MA) increases significantly as it proceeds from 
one phase to the next.  
The level of pharmaceutical innovative productivity in both countries was defined as the 
number of ongoing projects in different clinical phases compared to each other. For this 
purpose, the publications from the Norwegian Bioindustry association (Biotekforum) 
(Biotekforum 2011) and SwedenBIO (Swedenbio 2011) were used. Biotekforum conducts 
annual survey among Norwegian pharmaceutical firms to map their clinical development 
pipeline that is based on Norwegian R&D. SwedenBIO also conduct annual surveys aimed at 
mapping the clinical development pipeline of Swedish biotech firms that perform research in 
Sweden, and includes those based on Swedish research. Biotekforum report uses the Swedish 
report to compare the Norwegian situation to the progress in Swedish bioindustry (2007-2011 
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for Norway and 2006-2011 for Sweden). In this thesis, these comparative results are reported 
directly as a strong indication for innovative productivity of the SMEs in the two countries.  
70% of the Norwegian firms responded to the survey in 2011 (42 were asked), 19 of them had 
a pipeline based on Norwegian research, but only 14 had a clinical pipeline. Only the results 
for these firms are presented. Among the Swedish firms that responded the 2011 survey (88% 
of the 85 companies), 35 had a clinical pipeline and 11 had only late preclinical pipeline. Only 
the results for the firms with clinical pipeline will be presented in this thesis. Projects from 
AstraZeneca are not included here since it is not a SME.  
 
3.3 Independent variable: Role of the national medicines agency 
Primary data was acquired through interviews of selected employees in the agencies, the 
SMEs, and the trade associations in both countries. The interviews were performed using one 
standard set of questions. The follow-up questions in the course of the interview were 
adjusted to the informant’s level of information in the area. All interviews were performed in 
person, taped after permission from the informants and later transcribed. In Norway the 
interviews were done in Norwegian, and in Sweden in English. Table 2 gives an overview of 
the interview set up. 
Table 2- Overview of the interview set-up 
Country Organization Total number 
of informants 
Key 
informants* 
Total 
number of 
interviews 
Norway     
 NOMA 4** 2 4** 
 HoD 1 1 1 
 SME 1 1 1 1 
 SME 2 1 1 1 
 LMI 1 1 1 
Sum  5 8 6 8 
 
Sweden 
    
 MPA 1 1 1 
 SME 1 3 2 1 
 SME 2 1 1 1 
 SwedenBio 2 2 1 
Sum  4 7 6 4 
* Strategic / senior position or long term employee 
** Including one pilot interview 
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3.4 Institutional environment and strategic resources 
Both the primary data from the interviews and a range of secondary data (historical facts, 
strategy documents, annual reports, scientific papers and government reports) were used. The 
timeframe of this retrospective analysis was defined to start around the establishment of EMA 
in 1995- with the implementation of the new approval system for MPs- until today. 
3.5 Control variables 
Both the primary data from the standard interviews and a range of secondary data were used 
(OECD reports, government reports, etc.). In addition a limited interview of a Norwegian 
senior advisor in a European venture capital (VC) investment organization within healthcare 
was performed only to discuss the differences in the innovative environment of Norway and 
Sweden. 
 
4. CASE STUDY 
The findings are based on the primary and secondary data and are presented with a structure 
that reflects the research question and the theoretical model. Each of the following sections 
describe the findings related to one of the variables in the theoretical model; i.e. section 4.1 
shows the results for the innovative scope and innovative productivity of the SMEs 
(dependent variables), section 4.2 describes the findings for the role of the two national 
medicines agencies NOMA and MPA (independent variable), section 4.3 investigates the 
influence of the institutional environment on the role of the agencies, section 4.4 presents the 
influence of strategic resources on the role of the agencies, and section 4.5 describes other 
influential factors affecting the innovative scope and productivity of SMEs. Each of the 
sections describes the findings in Norway and in Sweden and is concluded with the summary 
of the findings.  
4.1 Innovative scope and productivity of SMEs in Norway and Sweden 
4.1.1 Innovative scope of SMEs within drug discovery and development 
The results indicate 3 important differences between the two countries: 
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1. Although the total number of the SMEs within drug discovery and development in 
Norway is 1/3rd of that of Sweden, the relative number of medium-sized firms is 
significantly higher in Norway (20% in Norway and <1% in Sweden) 
2. Despite the fact that the number of products under development in the portfolio of the 
mentioned SMEs in Norway is almost 1/3rd of that of Sweden, several products are 
launched by the Norwegian SMEs. 
3. Comparison of the launched products in Norway and Sweden reveals that surprisingly, 
Norwegian SMEs have produced more NCE/new biological products, one of which has 
received priority review from FDA.  
Table 3 illustrates the innovative scope of SMEs in Norway and Sweden within drug 
discovery and development.  
Table 3- Innovative scope of SMEs within drug discovery and development 
 Total 
No 
SMEs1) 
Micro / 
Small / 
Medium 
size 
EMA 
SME 
status2) 
No. 
Prod. 
Under 
dev. 
No. Prod. 
Launched 
3) 
NCE / 
New 
Biological 
prod.4) 
 
Orphan / 
Priority5) 
Norway 
 
22 14 / 4 / 4 7 49 7 6 * 1** 
Sweden 
 
62 38 / 19 / 5 20 145 4 1 - 
1) See appendix A for the list 
2) According to EMAs SME register for Norwegian and Swedish companies.  
3) Only from the websites of the companies. Marketed products which are entirely out-licensed 
are hence not included 
4) NCE = New chemical entity means that the active substance is completely new 
5) From the FDA annual lists (when the SME was the sponsor or applicant) and information 
on the websites of the SMEs 
*Including 3 fish vaccine products which are by definition not entirely new biological 
products  
** Photocure’s Hexvix received a priority review in 2010 and is launched.  
 
Both total number of the SMEs and their size (micro/small/medium, judged by the number of 
employees only) are presented in the first two columns.   
The third parameter shows how many of those SMEs have SME status at EMA, which grants 
substantial fee discounts to SMEs. This reveals the firms who have realized their need to seek 
regulatory and scientific advice. It may indicate the level of knowledge at the SME about 
what is offered regarding regulatory assistance. It may also reveal that those SMEs have 
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reached a certain point in the product development that necessitates seeking regulatory 
assistance, e.g. formal preclinical or Ph I clinical studies. The results is in line with the total 
number of SMEs (Norway is 1/3rd of Sweden) indicating that there should not be a big 
difference between the two countries.  
The fourth parameter is the number of products under development, which also is in line with 
the number of SMEs in the two countries (Norway 1/3rd of Sweden).  
The fifth parameter shows the number of products that are launched, which is surprisingly 
almost the double in Norway; i.e. 7 in Norway and 4 in Sweden. The sixth parameter shows 
that 6 of the 7 launched products in Norway is a new chemical entity (NCE) or a new 
biological product. Even if we exclude the three fish vaccines which are considered not to be 
entirely new, Norway still has 3 original products compared to Sweden who has only 1.  
As defined in the methodology, in this paper a breakthrough product is defined as one which 
has received a priority review in the FDA or an orphan drug designation in EU or USA. One 
of the products developed by Norwegian SMEs had received priority review by FDA. None of 
the products developed by Swedish SMEs had any of these two criteria.  
 
4.1.2 Innovative productivity of SMEs within (bio) pharmaceutical segment 
Figure 3 compares the clinical development status for Norwegian and Swedish projects that 
are based on the research in each of the two countries. The trend is that, since 2008, there has 
been an increase in the number of projects in all phases of clinical development among the 
Norwegian SMEs. In Sweden, however, it seems like the number of projects in the clinical 
phases are levelling off or decreasing. 
Figure 3A compares the projects in Ph I clinical studies in Norway and Sweden. The number 
of projects in Norway has increased from 6 in 2008 to 17 in 2011, while in Sweden it has 
decreased from 25 to 18 in the same period. This might indicate that in Norway there has been 
a larger portfolio in the preclinical phase that has successfully entered clinical studies. It may 
also indicate that the financial situation and access to financing has been better in Norway 
since it is far more expensive to perform clinical studies than preclinical ones. The recent 
financial crisis has affected Sweden in a greater extent than it has affected Norway. Another 
explanation might be that in Norway most of the clinical studies are done in the field of 
oncology/cancer. This is the only therapeutic area where Ph I studies are done on patients and 
not on healthy volunteers. It is a very attractive situation for the investors since in the same 
22 
 
study, not only the safety profile of the product is verified (which is the main goal of Ph I 
studies), but also some proof of concept on the effect of the product is collected. 
Figure 3- Ongoing clinical studies by SMEs in Norway and Sweden. 
A: Ph I, B: Ph II, C: Ph III 
 
 
Figure 3B compares the projects in Ph II in the two countries. The figure illustrates that 
between 2007 and 2010, there has been almost double as many Ph II studies in Sweden 
compared to Norway and with the exception of 2011, the number of these projects has been 
increasing. The majority of the Swedish projects are in Ph II. 
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Figure 3C shows the ongoing projects in Ph III. Swedish projects in Ph III show a steady 
increase over the time, whereas in Norway there has only been an increase since 2009 
following 3 years of stagnation. According to the report (Biotekforum 2011), the “jump” in 
2010 to 24 projects might have been due to over-reporting. Ph III studies are so large and 
expensive that normally the SMEs are not able to perform it alone and most of them join some 
type of alliance to be able to do this. If financing is the reason that Swedish SMEs move back 
regarding Ph I and II studies, this last graph might indicate that Ph III studies are less sensitive 
to financial crises than the two initial phases. One reason might be that due to the history of 
Big Pharma in Sweden, it is easier to find partners for expensive Ph III studies. 
 
4.1.3 Summary of the results for innovative scope and productivity 
The results seem to reveal an overall superior position of the Norwegian pharmaceutical 
SMEs regarding both innovative scope and productivity compared to the Swedish 
pharmaceutical SMEs. 
The innovative scope among Norwegian SMEs within drug discovery and development shows 
a trend towards breakthrough innovations, while a similar trend was not observed among 
Swedish SMEs. Norwegian SMEs have launched 6 original MPs, one of which received 
“priority review” status at FDA. Whereas in Sweden there is only one original MP launched 
by SMEs but it neither received “priority review” nor orphan status.  
The innovative productivity of Norwegian biopharmaceutical SMEs, judged by the number of 
ongoing projects in clinical trials, reveals an overall increase in the recent years. In the same 
period the innovative productivity of Swedish biopharmaceutical SMEs shows decrease or 
stagnation for Ph I and II studies, but Ph III studies have a trend of slight but steady increase. 
The number of Ph II projects is significantly higher in Sweden than it is in Norway. 
Financial problems are normally the major reason for stagnation or decrease of the number of 
the clinical studies.  
Focus of Norwegian SMEs on the therapeutic area of oncology, also discussed in section 4.5, 
might be one explanation for the unexpected performance of Norwegian SMEs with regard to 
innovative scope and productivity. 
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4.2 Role of the national medicines agencies  
4.2.1 Strategic goals and the predominant role of NOMA  
The main strategic goal of NOMA is in accordance with the political goals set by HoD, stated 
in the yearly budget allocation statement (Tildelingsbrev) and NOMA’s strategy document 
2010-2015. These are as follows: 
“NOMA shall contribute to ensure the fulfilment of the political goals regarding MPs and the 
reimbursement policies; i.e. Patients should have access to safe and effective MPs regardless 
of their ability to pay for the treatment, MPs should be used therapeutically and economically 
correct, MPs should have lowest possible price.” 
It is striking that NOMA has the health economic aspects of the MPs in focus in all three 
strategic goals of the organization.  
NOMA’s goals may be broken into three main categories: 1) Making sure that patients have 
access to necessary MPs which are safe and effective, 2) keeping the State’s costs on MPs 
under control, and 3) providing “producer-independent information” regarding MPs to the 
patients and the health professionals. 
The above strategic goals have strongly defined the role of NOMA in general and in relation 
to innovation facilitation.  
Table 4 summarizes the findings from the interviews regarding these 3 main categories. 
Regarding the first main goal, there is controversy as to how successful NOMA has been. 
NOMA statistics show that only 40% of MPs that have MA in Norway are on the Norwegian 
market (search in the NOMA’s internal database “Athene”). Most of these MPs are generics. 
According to a NOMA informant the small size of the Norwegian market, the strict pricing 
strategy, and the structure of the pharmacy chains in Norway who have their own preferred 
MPs can in sum explain this phenomenon. On the other hand, necessary innovative and 
generics MPs are continuously introduced to the Norwegian market despite the lower prices to 
an extent that few Norwegian patients suffer from lack of available and effective treatment. 
The HoD informant highlighted this fact as a sign of success for the pricing and 
reimbursement system. Norwegian market is seldom the first market for introduction of 
innovative MPs. According to the industry counterpart this is the direct result of the strict 
pricing and reimbursement strategy in Norway since the first country settles such vital factors 
for the success of a MP.  
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There is strong evidence that NOMA has had a remarkable success in achieving the goal to 
control the state’s costs on MPs, judged by the fact that Norway has one of the lowest MP 
prices in Europe (Håkonsen et al. 2009a), and a strict reimbursement strategy. NOMA’s 
success to achieve this goal was supported by all Norwegian informants except one who did 
not have any knowledge on this.   
Table 4- Summary and highlights of interviews regarding how successful NOMA has 
been to achieve its main strategic goals 
Main political goals NOMA/HoD informants SME/LMI informants 
1. Ensure that patients have 
access to safe and effective MPs  
 
- Other countries look to NOMA’s 
success that the MPs stay on the 
Norwegian market despite lower 
price  
- Limited and passive contribution 
to bringing new MPs to the market 
through assessment and approval 
of applications for MA.  
- Only 40% of MPs with a MA in 
Norway are on the Norwegian 
market, one of the reasons being 
tough price control 
No one wants to introduce their 
innovative MP in Norway as the 
first market due to the strict pricing 
policy. As a result, Norwegian 
patients will have to wait for the 
latest available treatment, including 
the breakthrough MPs.  
2. Ensure that the state’s costs on 
MPs is under control 
Very successful 
 
Very successful 
 
3. Provide producer-independent 
information to the patients and 
health professionals 
- The generics substitution has 
been a success, but is it due to the 
law enforcement or the 
information? 
- Active campaigns when the 
scepticism to the generics rise in 
the society have been successful 
- NOMA has achieved great 
success with the information 
regarding the reimbursement 
strategy and the generics 
substitution. 
- Not successful 
- Invisible in the media and society 
- Focusing on keeping the negative 
news/aspects of the MPs under 
control rather than pushing the 
positive aspects forward 
 
 
The success of the third goal regarding provision of producer-independent information to the 
patients and the health professionals also seems to be controversial. Most of these activities 
are aimed at generics substitution, which is enforced by the law and has been very successful. 
According to this law, when a MP goes off-patent, it is mandatory for the prescribers to 
prescribe the cheapest available generics if the MP is to be reimbursed. Despite several 
campaigns to convince the users that the approved generics are as good as the original MP, 
there is still evidence that not all patients or prescribers are convinced (Håkonsen et al. 2009b; 
Dalen et al. 2011). The information department at NOMA runs regular campaigns to inform 
better on this issue. When it comes to information regarding innovative MPs, NOMA seems 
to be rather invisible in the society and the media. Two of the informants from the industry 
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counterpart stated that NOMA’s focus regarding information is directed at controlling the 
negative aspects and news rather than communicating the positive news.   
There is little doubt that NOMA’s focus has been to control the industry. Both the NOMA 
employees and the industry counterparts expressed unanimously that the role of NOMA is to 
keep the MP prices low, have a strict reimbursement strategy, and to ensure that the industry 
complies with the current European legislations and rules through control and inspection. 
An indication that NOMA might have a responsibility regarding innovation was highlighted 
by the HoD informant to lie in the first part of the first goal; i.e. “patients should have access 
to safe and effective MPs regardless of their ability to pay for the treatment”.  
There is no evidence that NOMA at any time has had an active role regarding innovation 
facilitation. The NOMA informants thought of their role in innovation facilitation as non-
existing. A key NOMA informant stated:  
“To promote innovation is an unknown concept here. Maybe to facilitate or rather to 
be helpful is closer [to the reality]. Even that is not the direct intention, so the concept 
is underdeveloped. But the scientific assessors think that it is exciting to work with 
new and innovative products…Even the clinical trials unit thinks as an authority, they 
are gate-keepers…clinical trials must not harm the patients.”   
Another NOMA informant had the following comment: 
“In my experience, as long as I have been working at NOMA [since 1998] our role 
has been defined: How can we survive in this system without using many resources on 
it [scientific work] so that we can rather use our resources on the producer-
independent information and the pharmaco-economics? We decided not to take an 
active role [in the EU collaboration] but to [largely] adopt the decisions. When you 
take such a role you implicitly choose to set aside any innovation facilitation role. You 
just cannot be active, simulating and helping innovation when you want to let the 
world take the responsibility!” 
Nevertheless, although NOMA has not been actively “marketing” that the organization is 
willing to provide scientific and regulatory advice, there has been held numerous discussion 
meetings on the initiative from the industry. NOMA’s employees have also been available for 
informal discussions by phone.  The informant from the Norwegian SME 1 actively contacted 
NOMA’s scientific and regulatory employees when there was a need for discussions and 
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advice. This informant thought of NOMA’s experts as knowledgeable and competent and 
wondered why NOMA is not trying to make this competency more visible through better 
“marketing” (actively informing the actors on the areas of competence). During a recent 
meeting with some NOMA employees, the informant from Norwegian SME 2 had been 
positively surprised to hear that they recognized their task to give guidance to SMEs. Both 
Norwegian SMEs had been seeking scientific advice at several medicines agencies in other 
European countries, including MPA. 
NOMA has historically been short of necessary resources to handle the increasing number of 
applications. This has led to queues and long overdue deadlines, which are in principle legally 
binding. The necessary resources to resolve this situation have been provided, but it has taken 
years to remove the bottlenecks. Additionally, NOMA requires longer assessment time for 
clinical trial approvals than other European countries do. This has contributed to the 
reputation that NOMA is constantly short of resources or lacks enough experience and 
competence to rapidly assess the documentation (SME 2 informant).  
NOMA also has little activity regarding initiative to arrange information/educational meetings. 
Apart from SMEs, the academic research groups are in great need of such support.  
The absence of an active role regarding innovation facilitation at NOMA was indirectly 
confirmed by one NOMA informant and the HoD informant who stated that Norwegian 
regulations might contribute to breakthrough innovations by exercising strict price and 
reimbursement strategy; i.e. only real therapeutic improvements compared to existing MPs on 
the market are rewarded by a good price and inclusion in the reimbursement list. However, 
they did not address how the small Norwegian market can have such an impact on a firm’s 
strategy. 
Balancing the role of advice giver and discussion partner for the development of products on 
one hand and approving the same products on the other end was mentioned as potentially 
problematic by NOMA informants. This concern may be attributed to NOMA’s lack of 
sufficient experience in providing advice or in general scientific contact with the SMEs, since 
the MPA informant did not express similar concerns (see 4.2.2). The approval system is 
strictly regulated with hundreds of guidelines and regulations and there is little left to 
subjective evaluations.  The LMI informant expressed concerns about such reasoning being 
used as an excuse not to give advice especially to SMEs. 
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It is worth noting that all Norwegian informants, both from the industry side and NOMA/HoD 
side, suggested that supporting innovation should be included as one of the main points in 
NOMA’s strategy. Several informants pointed out that NOMA has now the competence and is 
mature enough to undertake such a task. This is also in the line with the current governmental 
activities regarding innovation (see section 4.5). 
 
4.2.2 Strategic goals and the predominant role of MPA  
The strategic goals (or main tasks) of MPA as defined in the annual report of 2011 is “to 
advance the health of Swedish people and animals. Both the patients and the health 
professionals should have access to safe and effective MPs with good quality. MPs shall be 
used in an efficient and cost-effective manner… MPA has a normative and regulative 
authority role regarding development of new products. Regarding product development MPA 
gives scientific advice, assesses the documentation for clinical trials and applications for 
MA…” 
This was confirmed by the MPA informant who stated it in another words:  
“Overall goal is to contribute to ensure that there are MPs on the market which have 
an acceptable benefit-risk balance, that the information about the product is adequate 
and useful, and that appropriate post marketing follow up is undertaken.”  
The goal described above can be broken down to the following: 1) ensure that MPs reach the 
market, 2) ensure that the benefit-risk balance of the MPs on the market is evaluated and is 
acceptable, 3) ensure that the necessary information about the MPs is available, and 4) ensure 
the appropriate post marketing follow up of the MPs. Both the innovation/industrial aspect of 
the MP development as well as the patient’s wellness and safety are highlighted in the goals. 
There is strong evidence that MPA has been successful to work towards their goals through 
assessment of a large number of MPs and through active involvement in the scientific advice 
activities, both at the European and the national level to make sure that they have enough 
knowledge about the products under development. Already in 2001 MPA was one of the most 
frequently used authorities in Europe, and in 2005 they were very close to be one of the 
leaders in the EU collaboration (see section 4.3). MPA is also very active with providing 
information and news, both to the public and to the health professionals through the electronic 
service called “Information from MPA” and their phone information service. 
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MPA does take an active role regarding both patient safety and innovation facilitation. Both 
MPA and the Swedish SMEs/SwedenBIO expressed that the MPA’s main role is to ensure 
patient’s safety through all the phases of drug development, approval and post marketing. 
They do this through active involvement by giving scientific and regulatory advice to the 
pharmaceutical industry, helping them to do the right things first time. MPA was regarded as 
a very competent authority by the majority of the informants from both countries. 
With regards to MPA’s active role and direct responsibility in innovation facilitation, the 
MPA employee commented:  
“Our role is to give scientific advice to guide to as optimal development as possible to 
avoid wasting resources and time on the development or even loosing good drug 
candidates. We see this as our contribution to enable that in the other end we get 
adequately studied products.”  
The MPA informant did not appear to be concerned about having “two hats” or a double role; 
i.e. one that helps the industry to develop MPs, the other evaluates the same MP. The 
impression is that MPA’s extensive experience in such activities gave them confidence that 
there is no double role when it comes to the scientific aspects. What they do is to translate the 
guidelines to the product specific enquiries from the industry, especially SMEs, and make it 
clearer for them what studies they need to perform.  
MPA’s organization culture of openness and interaction, strongly fostered by the management, 
was unanimously indicated as a key success factor by the informants from both Swedish and 
Norwegian SMEs and trade associations.  Transparency of the assessments and decision 
making and focus on customer relations were highlighted by the Swedish SMEs and 
SwedenBIO, who also stated that this organization culture has gradually evolved probably 
since MPA became an independent organization in 1990.  
The Swedish innovative pharmaceutical industry seems to take it for granted that their 
national agency is interested in them and their needs. The special need of the SMEs to have 
access to a service-minded authority that can give guidance on a short notice was 
acknowledged both by the MPA and the SwedenBIO/Swedish SME informants. The 
informant from the Swedish SME 2 stated: 
“Small companies have 2-3 people who are not experts in any field. We have 
consultants, of course. They can say I am not sure but I will call MPA and get back to 
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you. There is a web of interactions. You need to pose intelligent questions to get 
proper answers… One clinical study is a huge undertaking for a small company in 
terms of money and efforts. [It is] very important to get the advice to do it properly for 
the benefit of everyone.” 
Both of the Norwegian SME informants had experience with MPA regarding scientific advice 
and were in general satisfied with the outcome. However, the informant from Norwegian 
SME 1 stated that despite MPA’s active marketing of this service to be expedite, they actually 
under-delivered regarding the timelines and were not prepared for all the pre-submitted 
questions, but for the most critical ones.  
SwedenBIO informants said that they have had several meetings with the current DG of the 
MPA with the suggestion to establish a unit at MPA to handle the needs of the SMEs. The 
response has been quite promising, they said. 
 
4.2.3 Conclusions on the roles of NOMA and MPA  
The overall impression from the interviews is that NOMA’s dominating role is one of 
“controlling the pharmaceutical industry”, whereas the dominating role of MPA is one of 
“actively facilitating/ supporting innovation in the pharmaceutical industry”.  
NOMA’s predominant role is to ensure that the industrial actors conform to the regulations 
mostly through control and also to a less extent through information and guidance. The few 
non-routine activities at NOMA in favour of innovation and guidance to the innovative 
companies have a passive character where the intention on the NOMA’s side is seldom 
contribution to innovation. The organization is characterized as somehow closed and seems to 
lack initiative with regards to innovation. This should not be surprising since the concept of 
promoting innovation is not defined as one of the tasks of NOMA in its steering documents.  
MPA’s role is to ensure that patients have access to MPs with acceptable risk-benefit and 
quality. They do this mainly by active involvement in product development from early stages 
so that the industrial actors do the right things first time, and through assessment of 
documentation for numerous new MPs. To contribute to and oversee the development of MPs 
is defined as one of the tasks of MPA in the steering documents. The organization is 
characterized by transparency regarding decision making and openness to customers. 
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The annual reports and the strategy documents of both agencies confirm the above 
observations (explained more in section 4.3). This difference in roles and attitudes regarding 
innovation is also in agreement with the author’s initial reason to study these two agencies as 
contrasting or polar cases.  
 
4.3 Influence of the institutional environment on the roles of the national 
medicines agencies 
4.3.1 European and national institutional environment in Sweden and Norway 
EU and national institutional forces have influenced the roles of the agencies along two 
different axes. Naturally, the EU has the predominant influence on MPA since Sweden joined 
the EU, while NOMA seems to experience the national forces to a larger extent. 
Table 5 summarizes the historical events that shaped the structure, roles and activities of MPA 
and NOMA (Dyrdal 2004, Annual reports and public information). There are four important 
differences in the institutional environment of the MPA and NOMA:  
1. Sweden joined the EU, Norway did not. 
2. Sweden has a history of strong innovative pharmaceutical industry such as 
AstraZeneca and Pharmacia. Pharmaceutical Industry was once the third most 
important source of income for the Swedish state. Norway only had a medium size 
innovative company, Nycomed Imaging, within niche product portfolio (imaging 
diagnostics techniques). Norwegian economy never relied on the pharmaceutical 
industry. 
3. In contrast to NOMA, MPA never had the responsibility for price and reimbursement 
of MPs. In Sweden, another organization (TLV) has the task to determine whether a 
MP shall be subsidized by the state. 
4. MPA is an independent and self-financed organization, NOMA is not (see section 4.4) 
EU has traditionally had a market orientation, focusing on free movement of the goods and 
development of predictable conditions for the pharmaceutical R&D in order to ensure 
innovation (Vestlund 2009). On the other hand, in Sweden and Norway the consumer and 
health-oriented philosophy has historically been steering the control of pharmaceuticals 
(Dyrdal 2004). There are and have been variations between the two countries, which are 
elaborated below in organization-specific sections.  
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Table 5- Historical events that shaped the structure, roles and activities of MPA and 
NOMA 
Chronology of events Norwegian medicines authority Swedish medicines authority 
1990  
The traditional Nordic 
collaboration within drug 
assessment and evaluation is 
still ongoing 
SLK is a unit in National Board of Health 
(Helsetilsynet).  
Spesialitetsnemnda (Specialties Board) still 
has the decision making authority. 
Since 1941, “Behovsparagraphen” (the Need 
clause) has been in force. 
MPA established as an independent and 
self-financed organization with fee-based 
income. The goal is to improve the 
organization into a more effective one and 
to prepare for the future EU collaboration 
system. MPA does not evaluate Price and 
reimbursement. 
1993- EU finally decided on 
the structure of the “New 
system” for MP approvals 
 MPA has already adapted to the EU’s New 
system. 
1994 Norway joined EEA. “Need clause” was 
abolished. 
SLK established as an independent 
organization. The goal was to become more 
effective and market-oriented 
Sweden receives observer status in EU due 
to EU membership and gains access to the 
committees and documents.  
Swedish government gives MPA the task 
to use the preparatory period to develop a 
competitive European authority 
1995- The EMA is 
established 
Norway is excluded from the drug evaluation 
activities in EU and the assessment documents 
are not available to EEA members. With 
Denmark, Sweden and Finland in the EU, 
Norway and Iceland are on their own. 
 
1994-1999  
Explosion of the public 
pharmaceutical costs  
In 1997 Strømutvalget and Grundutvalget 
deliver their reports on pricing and 
reimbursement strategies. Pharmaco-economic 
unit established at SLK. 
Negotiations on extension of EEA agreement 
to include the New system for MPs.  
In 1997 media criticized MPA for the close 
relations with the industry. MPA invited 
them to inspect the organization and its 
procedures.  
In 1998 MPA is one of the best providers 
of product information on the national level 
1998- The extended EEA 
agreement is approved 
Observer status for Norway in the EU system  
2000- Extended EEA 
agreement is in force  
SLK is fully operative in activities except the 
decision making processes where it is 
observer without a voting right. SLK 
international vision stated in the annual report:  
- Norway to become one of the preferred 
assessors within its fields of expertise 
- Norway to be world leader within fish 
diseases 
“Contribution to cost effective use of MPs” 
is stated as one of the tasks of MPA 
2001 NOMA is established through integration of 
the reimbursement and the 
inspection/licensing functions. Generic 
substitution becomes mandatory  
MPA is one of the most frequently used 
authorities in the EU system. The 
responsibility for medical devices is 
transferred to MPA 
2002 - Drug reforms in 
Sweden, TLV is established 
Same international vision as in 2001  
2003 NOMA international vision was entirely 
removed from the annual report 
 
2005 The new national policy for pharmaceuticals 
(Legemiddelmeldingen) is presented. Strongly 
influences NOMAs future strategy 
The initial goal that MPA should be one of 
the leading authorities in the EU looks 
realistic 
2007 Norway has one of the lowest MP prices 
among 10 Northern European countries 
 
2009 Reorganization- The new Information 
department is established 
MPA is one of the most preferred 
authorities in the EU due to “Regulatory 
excellence”. 
2010  National strategy for pharmaceuticals 2010. 
MPA receives the national task to 
contribute to better MP use and to 
collaborate with the actors in this area. 
New vision is established.  
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The Norwegian pharmaceutical regulatory system has been summarized as autonomic and 
closed with a small volume of national pharmaceutical industry, cultivating only the patient’s 
interests. In comparison, the Swedish system appears as a more open system with a well 
developed relationship between the authorities and the large national pharmaceutical industry 
(Dyrdal 2004). 
 
4.3.2 Institutional environment that shaped NOMA’s role 
The consumer/health-oriented philosophy in Norway resulted in introducing “the need clause” 
(Behovsparagraphen) in 1941, which largely limited marketing of generics to a controllable 
level (maximum 5 for each indication) (Dyrdal 2004). This clause, required medical need for 
a MP to get registered and was removed in 1994 due to the EEA agreement. However, a 
review of 1999 annual report from SLK (Norwegian Medicines Control Agency, the 
predecessor organization to NOMA) shows that ”To regulate the market entrance and oversee 
public’s need for good and effective MPs”  is stated as the first of the two principal goals of 
the organization. This may indicate that the tradition of regulation through limitation of 
market access was now being translated into new forms. 
The national medicines agencies practice and implement the national pharmaceuticals 
strategy/policy established by the politicians. Although EU/EEA agreements demand that the 
centrally approved MPs receive MA in all the member countries, there are no common 
regulations on national health care policies including pricing or reimbursement strategies. 
Here is where the different countries can control the introduction of the new MPs to the 
market. This window of opportunity has been extensively used by the Norwegian authorities 
in order to control the health-related costs. Maybe not surprisingly (and most probably 
unconsciously) this has been done through regulations that have resulted in limited market 
access of MPs. As mentioned previously, 60% of the MPs that are approved in the European 
system, mostly generics, never enter the market in Norway. This is by choice of the MA 
holder and there are several reasons to it, one of them being strict price and reimbursement 
strategy in Norway. 
Norway was one of the first countries in the world to establish priority setting /health 
economic strategies (Calltorp 1999), the so-called “Lønning I” in 1985. Already in 1991 the 
doctor’s duty to prescribe the cheapest copy product had been introduced. The background 
was the general rise in the sales of the pharmaceutical, growing at a yearly rate of 5.2% 
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between 1980 and 1995. This was mostly attributed to higher price for the newer MPs. 
Norwegian state covered 2/3rd of the costs, which was becoming formidable. The yearly 
increase in the reimbursement budget was at 8%. However, NOMA’s annual reports in the 
90s repeatedly pinpoint that the cost of pharmaceuticals in Norway was lower than other 
Nordic countries. It is likely that lack of Norwegian state’s dependency on income from a 
strong and influential Big Pharma made it quite easy for the authorities to select cost control 
on pharmaceuticals as their most important strategy to control the costs of public health.  
In the late 1995/ early 1996 two different groups were appointed by HoD (highly encouraged 
by the Ministry of Finance) to assess the framework for: 1) price and turnover for 
pharmaceuticals (Strømutvalget) and 2) reimbursement of pharmaceutical costs 
(Grundutvalget). Both reports were finalized in January 1997 and have influenced the later 
political direction not only regarding maximum price and reimbursement strategies, but also 
the availability of the producer-independent information to prescribers and setting limitations 
on the contact between the pharmaceutical industry and the prescribers. 
In 2005 the Norwegian national strategy for pharmaceuticals (Legemiddelmeldingen) was 
finalized. The document indicated that the superior political goal for the pharmaceuticals is 
their correct use, main focus being on the costs (discussed in section 4.2). Chapter 7 of this 
document describes the government’s ambitions regarding research on pharmaceuticals. In 
short, “The public organizations should focus their efforts on knowledge that is of interest to 
the patients and the society, the research type which the industry does not perform today” 
(St.meld.nr.18, 2004-2005, pp. 9). This is an indication that probably the health authorities in 
Norway do not have any specific ambitions regarding innovation facilitation for SMEs. This 
is in contrast to the increasing level of other government initiatives and attempts to facilitate 
biomedical innovation in Norway, some of which are mentioned in section 4.5. The national 
strategy for innovation “An innovative and sustainable Norway” was published by NHD in 
2008 (St.meld.nr.7, 2008-2009). One of the main points was that the government will 
facilitate the innovation in SMEs (Ibid, pp. 6). Those intentions have been reinforced through 
the recently published whitepaper “Tools for Growth”, where the formation of different seed-
funds for, among others, health related industry has been addressed (St.meld.nr.22, 2011-
2012). According to the LMI informant, LMI has been actively seeking collaboration with 
NHD regarding innovation in pharmaceutical industry since HoD does not show interest in 
industrial development. A statement from the HoD informant was in the line with this 
observation: 
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“With NHD’s objectives it is great that Norwegian pharmaceutical industry is 
flourishing. According to HOD’s objectives, we should give priority to cost effective 
MPs for serious conditions. Where the innovation is done geographically does not 
influence this” 
There is evidence of NOMA’s resistance to the traditional view and the institutional unilateral 
focus on controlling the industry. Annual reports reveal that in the transition period of 
inclusion in the new EU system and the establishment of NOMA (1999-2002) the agency had 
some ambitions regarding the level of its assessment competence in the MP approval process 
(Table 5). NOMA even aimed at becoming the world leader in the area of fish diseases. 
Apparently, no additional resources were allocated from HoD to realize these scientific 
ambitions, since all the ambitious goals were removed from the annual reports since 2003. A 
key NOMA informant said:  
“When we try to explain [to HoD] that Norway is much larger than many other 
countries, Cyprus, Malta, etc., and cannot be free-rider, or that it is advantageous for 
us to have the areas of expertise because then we also learn about the therapeutic 
area for the benefit of the reimbursement strategy, it is very difficult to get any 
response.” 
On the cognitive aspects, one can certainly point at the general scepticism towards the profit-
maximizing pharmaceutical industry in the Norwegian society. The underlying egalitarian 
mindset has deep roots in the Norwegian culture and is expressed as the scepticism towards 
any attempts to making profit.  
  
4.3.3 Institutional environment that shaped MPA’s role 
As opposed to the NOMA’s situation, the institutional environment of the MPA seems to be 
less complex and rather straight forward due to Sweden’s EU membership, which dominated 
any national institutional forces. According to Dyrdal (Dyrdal 2004) because of the more 
holistic national pharmaceutical strategy in Sweden, which balances between the industrial 
structure and the patient’s safety, the response to the increase in the state’s expenditure on 
pharmaceuticals came rather late; i.e. in 1998 it came on the political agenda resulting in the 
2002 drug reforms. Although MPA has earlier been involved in evaluation of the MPs for the 
reimbursement, the agency never had the responsibility for this task. In 2002, TLV was 
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established with similar tasks as the department of pharmaco-economics at NOMA. In the 
same year generic substitution became mandatory in Sweden (Godman et al. 2009).  
MPA has clearly selected to influence EU’s scientific decision making through strong and 
active involvement in the development of regulations regarding MPs. The importance of the 
high quality of the national pharmaceutical industry in taking this active role cannot be 
overemphasized. 
Already in 1993-1994, MPA started to get more involved in dialog meetings with the industry 
in order to facilitate pharmaceutical development. This was considered not only to help the 
pharmaceutical firms but also to increase the competence of the assessors and prepare them 
for the assessment work in the European community (MPA 1993-1994).  In 1997, MPA was 
subject to criticism from the media due to close contact with the industry in aftermaths of 
safety problems with some MPs. MPA, however, declared that they have a clear policy in all 
these cases and invited the media to inspect the organization and its routines (MPA 1997). 
There is no sign of such inspection in the annual reports of 1998 or later.  
In 2005 MPA was inspected by Swedish state authorities, which concluded that MPA’s goal 
to be one of the leading countries in the EU is not far to be achieved (MPA 2005).  
Recently MPA has been criticized to be less visible in the national arena than in the EU. For 
this reason, the efforts of the current DG are mainly focused towards the national actors 
(MPA and SwedenBIO informants).  In 2009, MPA decided that their vision of becoming the 
centre of regulatory excellence was achieved. In accordance with increasing national focus, 
MPA selected a new vision: A leading force in the collaboration for better health (En ledende 
kraft i samverkan för bättre hälsa). In 2010, MPA received the national task and the resources 
to form a centre for better use of pharmaceuticals and in 2011 the responsibility to coordinate 
the activities related to the national strategy for pharmaceuticals.  
Nevertheless, such recent national focus at MPA has not resulted in less activity of the agency 
at the EU level. It seems like the long and rich experience of intensive EU collaboration has 
equipped MPA with necessary skills and competence to also handle the national tasks. 
In 2010, the revised Swedish national strategy for pharmaceuticals was published with the 
title “Correct use of pharmaceuticals for the benefit of patients and the society” (Rätt 
läkemedels-användning till nytta för patient och samhälle). The five pillars of the strategy are 
world class medical results and patient safety, equal health, cost-effective use of MPs, 
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attractiveness for innovation of products and services, minimum of environmental hazards. 
This illustrates that even when the costs become serious issues, the innovation is not being 
neglected by the health authorities in Sweden.  
 
4.3.4 Conclusions on the influence of the institutional environment of NOMA and 
MPA on their roles 
The major institutional forces influencing the roles of both agencies are at two levels: EU and 
national. Both agencies have been strongly influenced by the EU regulations. In Sweden, 
these forces have been mostly in the same direction as the national forces; i.e. innovation and 
industry orientation. MPA has protected the national tradition of focus on the patient safety 
through active participation in the approval procedures for new MPs and preparation of 
regulatory guidelines. The result has been the predominant innovation facilitation role. 
In Norway, the national institutional forces appear to be more at conflict with the EU 
framework with regard to innovation facilitation. Norwegian health authorities seem to 
continue the tradition of control of market access for MPs (the heritage from “the need 
clause”) in new forms; i.e. through strict price and reimbursement strategies. It seems likely 
that an important factor for the absence of the authorities’ real interest and an active role 
regarding innovation facilitation is due to historical lack of an innovative national Big Pharma 
in Norway. All the above mentioned factors in addition to the general scepticism of the 
Norwegian society towards the profit maximizing pharmaceutical industry have been 
imposing a predominantly controlling role to NOMA.    
 
4.4 Availability and influence of strategic resources on the role of the 
national medicines agencies 
National medicines agencies are typical examples of knowledge-intensive organizations that 
depend solely on the knowledge and competence of their employees to fulfil their tasks. The 
results from the interviews indicated that being in possession of employees with diverse 
background and high level of relevant education and industrial experience is considered as 
strength for the medicines agencies that serve the pharmaceutical industry as a customer. 
Industrial background of the employees increases the level of awareness about the challenges 
that the pharmaceutical firms, especially the innovative ones, face.  All informants from the 
industry side in both countries as well as several of the informants from the agencies 
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mentioned the importance of exchanging employees between the regulatory authorities and 
the industry.  
The availability and the background of the strategic human resources in NOMA and MPA 
seem to be one of the reasons for the differences in their roles. All the informants in both 
countries regarded the existence of strategic resources as vital to the role.  
The results also showed that it is not considered to be particularly prestigious to work at any 
of the two national agencies with the possible exception of senior positions. However, 
increasingly more experienced and competent people seek jobs at both agencies due to the cut 
downs in the industry. Having access to knowledgeable clinicians/MDs is a great strength 
regarding evaluation of risk-benefit of the MPs and especially in scientific advice situations. 
MDs are considered to be difficult to recruit in both agencies, MDs with industrial 
background were considered almost impossible to recruit even in Sweden with the large 
industry sector.  
When discussing the strategic resources in the two agencies, one important factor should be 
taken into consideration: MPA was established as a self-financed organization whose income 
was fee-based (there are fees for various types of assessments, scientific advice activities, 
annual fees to keep the MP’s on the market, etc.). They have had the freedom to develop the 
organization more or less as they wished as long as they kept their budget. This is in contrast 
to NOMA, which is also in practice completely fee-financed, but the “income” is directly 
transferred to the state treasury and it is the parliament that allocates the yearly budget for 
NOMA along with the tasks to be fulfilled.  
Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 describe the development and growth of the two organizations in 
general, with emphasis on the development of competences in relevant units that are or can be 
involved in innovation facilitation in addition to the units that have enjoyed the greatest 
political attention. 
 
4.4.1 Influence of the strategic resources at NOMA 
Before the establishment of NOMA in 2000, SLK had 98 employees in 1999, which has more 
than doubled in 2012.  
The DG in the critical period of establishment of the new EU system and EMA (until 1996) 
was of the opinion that with the extension of the EEA agreement and inclusion of SLK in the 
39 
 
European collaboration system, SLK will be able to reduce the number of its (scientific) 
employees, since Norway could trust other countries to do the assessments (NOMA 
informants). According to one NOMA informant, some people at HoD still remember this and 
might be waiting for this time to come.  
Between 1996 and 1999 there was lack of any strategic plan for adjustments to the extended 
EEA/EFTA agreement and preparations for the establishment of NOMA. For more details see 
section 4.3.  
 
Table 6- Overview of NOMA’s organization growth with emphasis on selected units   
Employees 1998 2000 2001 2006 2012 
Total No. (full-time 
equivalent work 
years) 1) 
98 (March 
1st 1999) 
117 139 173^ 229^ 
Master degree or 
higher 2) (% of 
permanent positions) 
- - - 106 
(61%) 
134 
(58.5%) 
MD/PhD/Pharmacist - - - - 5 /39 /59 
Scientific assessment 
of applications3) (% 
permanent positions) 
- - - 39* 
(22%) 
51** 
(22%) 
Pharmaco-economics 5*** - 9*** 23# 23^ 
Information - - - 7# 21^ 
1) According to the government documents (St. prop.) for the corresponding years 
2)  According to the State’s database (SAP) 
3) Sources are the NOMA resource mapping document in 2006, a draft report for the department for MP 
approvals before the 2009 reorganization 
^ Number of Permanent positions  
*In department for MP approvals plus 5 employees dealing with assessment of vaccines, and 3 employees who 
assessed the pharmacovigilance and 4 who assessed clinical trials applications. 
** Estimation of total number of people working in all units corresponding to the same units reported in the 2006 
organization  
*** Reported in the annual reports for SLK/NOMA 
# Full-time equivalent work years according to the NOMA resource mapping document in 2006 
 
The development of NOMA as an organization has been in accordance with the political goals 
and vision. Table 6 summarizes the growth of the organization in terms of the number of 
employees and specific competencies/units. Currently, 60% of the employees at NOMA have 
Master degree or higher. 25% of the employees are pharmacists with Master degree; several 
of them have PhD and are also included in that statistics. 
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The department of pharmaco-economics had a steep growth from 9 to 23 employees (+220%) 
between 2001 and 2006, which indicates the political focus on this function. Several of the 
employees have industrial background, and historically, many of the employees in this 
department have ended up in the pharmaceutical industry. According to the NOMA and HoD 
informants there is a direct contact and close collaboration, through both formal and informal 
meetings, between the Pharmaco-economics department at NOMA and the Pharmaceutical 
section at HoD, which is the unit that endorses NOMA’s budget and annual plans. The current 
head of the Pharmaceutical section at HoD was employed as the head of the pharmaco-
economics department at SLK/NOMA between 1998 and 2004. After moving to HoD, he 
took over the responsibility for the compilation of the 2005 national strategy for 
pharmaceuticals (see section 4.3).  
The department of medical information was established in 2008 (previous to this it was the 
information section) and has as its main task to provide “producer-independent product 
information” in accordance with the NOMA’s political goals. This also aims at reducing the 
costs of the MPs through provision of information basically in the direction of “cheaper 
medicines are as good as more expensive ones” (NOMA informant). Today this department 
has 21 employees, a 300% increase since 2006. According to the NOMA informants there is a 
close collaboration also between this department and the Pharmaceuticals section at HoD. 
Following extension of the EEA agreement the assessment units needed to be strengthened 
with several committee members and assessors. NOMA strengthened the assessment function 
by 11 new employees in 2000. Today approximately 50 employees, including the committee 
members, work in the assessment units. The relative increase in the number of employees in 
these units has been 26% in the past 6 years despite the increasing number of scientific 
committees and more complex regulations and guidelines during this period. 
Currently there are only 5 MDs working at the agency, 2 of them work in the assessment 
department as committee members. Nevertheless, 31 out of the 39 employees with PhD work 
in the assessment units (17% of the employees at NOMA have a PhD). This indicates the high 
level of scientific competence in these units. The number of PhDs at NOMA has been 
increased in the recent years, mostly due to the general increase in the number of PhDs in 
Norway and lack of other relevant jobs. Only a few employees in the assessment units have 
industrial experience. 
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The informants from the assessment department did not experience any direct contact with the 
Pharmaceuticals sections at HoD, apart from the formal and seldom reporting meetings (once 
or twice yearly) where the entire top management of NOMA attend.  According to a key 
NOMA informant this is a sign of independency of the agency regarding decision-making; i.e. 
NOMA’s scientific decisions cannot be politically or otherwise influenced by the ministry. 
NOMA informants from assessment units, however, argued that a closer contact with HoD 
might increase the ministry’s understanding of their situation, tasks and obligations. 
The observations regarding what units at NOMA have open and direct contact with HoD also 
reflect the political priorities, well documented in NOMA’s steering documents (Section 4.3).  
NOMA has always had employees with industrial experience. However, due to the historical 
lack of national innovative Big Pharma, most of them had background from daughter 
companies of international innovative giants where the research and innovation activities at 
large took place in other countries. According to one NOMA informant this might be one 
important reason for lack of attention towards strengthening of the organization to contribute 
to national innovative activities.   
Despite NOMA’s contribution to many of EMA’s committees and working parties, the 
agency does not contribute to the scientific advice working party (SAWP). This is the group 
that receives and assesses the questions from the developers and provides them with advice on 
how to design their studies and  is considered to be one of the most important initiatives in 
respect to innovation facilitation. According to one NOMA informant the reason that NOMA 
did not attend in SAWP to start with was attributed to both the continuous lack of sufficient 
resources (in the assessment units) and to the level of competence of the available resources at 
that time. This informant stated that NOMA is currently in quite a different situation with 
regard to competence and degree of maturity within assessment functions, and now would be 
the right time to undertake this kind of responsibility. The interviews at NOMA revealed that 
the recent awareness on NOMA’s responsibility towards pharmaceutical innovation has been 
initiated by one of the newly employed top management members with a background from a 
large innovative pharmaceutical company.   
 4.4.2 Influence of the strategic resources at MPA 
A review of MPA annual reports from 1992 onwards showed that the ambition of the agency 
and its mandate from political side has been to develop the organization to become a 
competitive European authority already in 1992 (LVs uppdrag är att utveckla organisationen 
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till en konkurrenskraftig europeisk myndighet). One of the main reasons for MPA to select 
this ambitious goal was to be able to control the MPs that enter the market to protect Swedish 
patients (MPA informant). 
The changes in MPA’s organization happened in parallel with establishment of EMA and 
Sweden becoming an EU member. At the time MPA was in possession of a DG who, 
according to the MPA informant, was a visionary clinician and the first Swedish member in 
the European Committee for Human Medicinal products (CHMP). It seems like the DG as 
well as several strong and ambitious senior scientific employees at the MPA were responsible 
for the selected vision of that time to become one of the leaders in the EU collaboration on 
drug approvals. All Swedish informants confirmed that such a vision could not have started 
from the political level; i.e. it was the key people and the management at MPA who 
recognized the potential of their available resources and competencies, decided that this 
organization can have a role in the EU, and influenced the politicians in this direction.  
Table 7 illustrates the number of employees and some selected employee categories extracted 
from the MPA’s annual reports. The organization has grown more than 300% since 1992.  
The relative number of employees in the core business has been kept at 53-60%. The 
remaining employees are the leaders and the supporting functions (administrative officers/ 
secretaries/ assistants). The total number and percentage of MDs increased to 27 in 1998 
following the EU membership of Sweden and the establishment of EMA. Unfortunately, the 
later reports do not include such details. According to a NOMA informant, many of the MDs 
at MPA were part time, since MPA management wanted them to keep their competence 
through clinical practice. The total number of PhDs has increased significantly, although its 
percentage of the total number of employees is decreasing. 
According to the MPA informant, there are currently 200 people involved in the assessments 
and scientific advice activities. This does not include the pharmacovigilance unit who deals 
with follow up of side effects after marketing (signal detections and inspections). 
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Table 7- Overview of MPA’s organization growth 
Year Total 
number of 
employees 
Total number 
(%) within 
core 
competence 1) 
Number (%) 
pharmacist 2) 
Number (%) 
MD 3) 
Number (%) 
of other 
natural 
science 
major 
Number (%) 
PhDs 
1992-93 187 - - - - 25 (13%) 
1993-94 199 - 103 (52%) 17 (8.5%)* - 40 (20%) 
1994-95 204 - 101 (50%) 20 (10%)* - 40 (20%) 
1998 246 141 (57%) 70 (28%)** 27 (11%)** 24 (9.8%)** 80 (32.5%) 
2001 308 172 (56%) - - - 80 (26%) 
2004 418 222 (53%) - - - 100 (25%) 
2009 590 351 (60%) - - - - 
2011 687 - - - - 146 (21%) 
1) In Swedish: kärnkompetens 
2) Largest group  
3) Second largest group 
* Includes also veterinarians 
** In the core business 
 
Due to the existence of leading innovative pharmaceutical firms in Sweden, MPA had better 
access to resources with industrial experience in R&D and innovation compared to NOMA. 
One of the informants from the Swedish SME 1 said: 
“There have been lots of people from Academia in the MPA, or coming from the 
industry to the agency and vice versa. So I think there has been exchange of 
competences and experiences…There is a lot expertise in early phase research and 
they are even specialists in some areas.”  
When MPA became an independent agency, it was a requirement that it should be self-
financed. This is considered one of the main reasons that the management decided to develop 
the scientific assessment as the major pillar of the organization (MPA 1992-1993; Dyrdal 
2004). This has brought some concerns regarding the degree of neutrality and independence 
of the agency from the industry. The MPA informant stated: 
“The critics of some at the European level are that regulatory agencies are too close 
to the industry, since industry pays for the assessments, and the agencies depend on 
their fees. To us that does not influence our decisions. The assessors are not thinking 
about the fees” 
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4.4.3 Conclusions on the influence of strategic resources  
MPA has always been a larger organization than NOMA, also when the population difference 
is corrected for. Since MPA has focused much more on the scientific competencies, it has 
attracted several MDs than NOMA has done. The relative number of PhDs at MPA has also 
been much higher than that of NOMA in the earlier years, and it has become more even just in 
the recent years. The exchange of employees and resources between NOMA: HoD: industry 
in the field of pharmaco-economics may remind of the exchange of people and experience 
between academia: industry: MPA in the scientific assessment related fields, illustrating 
where the priorities on building competencies and exchanging the experience have been 
placed in the two countries.  
The political climate in Sweden at the time the country became EU member coincided with 
the existence of visionary DG and senior employees at MPA, all of them having scientific 
background, who decided to set ambitious goals for the organization in line with the political 
goals of the country. This was made possible also due to MPA being an independent self-
financed organization based on the fees. Those ambitious goals not only formed the role of 
MPA in innovation facilitation, but also contributed to attraction of highly qualified 
employees with strong scientific background and industrial experience to further strengthen 
the role.  
At NOMA, similar phenomenon is observed in the area of pharmaco-economics. The fact that 
the head of pharmaco-economics department at NOMA moved to HoD and has since been the 
head of pharmaceuticals section at HoD has settled the course for strengthening the field of 
pharmaco-economics. In addition, the information department with the main tasks in the same 
direction has been growing fast.  
In the period of establishment of the new system of drug approvals, the DG of SLK did not 
seem to have a vision of taking the opportunity for growth, but actually thought that the 
scientific organization can be reduced. By the time the current DG (a former 
scientist/academic and assessor) started in her position, the main goals of the new 
organization were more or less established. Additionally, the competence of the assessors at 
that time was considered to be lower than necessary for getting involved in scientific advice 
activities. 
In summary, there appears to be a strong connection between the type of background/ 
expertise of the strategic key employees and their level of ambitions at the time of change in 
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both organizations. Those strategic persons seem to have strongly influenced the roles of both 
agencies also in the aftermath. Building strategic competences in different areas has attracted 
different types of competences to the two agencies which in turn has reinforced the defined 
strategic competence area.  
NOMA does not seem to have a real choice of prioritizing its resources since its budget is 
connected to specified tasks and is allocated by the parliament/ministry of finance based on 
recommendations from HoD. 
 
4.5 Other influential factors on the innovation scope and productivity  
A plethora of literature has addressed the factors that impact innovation. Not only the 
determinants of innovative scope (Koberg et al. 2003) and innovative output (Ahuja et al. 
2008) have been addressed, but also the effect of networking on innovation has been analysed 
(Pittaway et al. 2004). In general, the nature and structure of industry and the firms, network 
of the organizations, and the institutional factors such as national systems for innovation have 
been drawn upon as important elements of innovation.   
There are numerous factors that may influence the innovative scope and productivity in 
pharmaceutical SMEs in Sweden and Norway, the most important ones are summarized in 
Table 8. These factors can be classified in different categories: 
4.5.1 Government initiatives 
In both countries there is some political attention towards innovation within (bio) 
pharmaceuticals and health sector. It seems, however, that Norway is a bit ahead concerning 
the infrastructure. This is particularly observed in the government funds and tax benefits. Also 
the bankruptcy regulation is in favour of Norway, which might partly explain why 
Norwegians are willing to take higher risks (cognitive variables in Table 8).  
4.5.2 Scientific environment, clusters and network 
In Norway, the number one field for clinical trials of products based on Norwegian research is 
cancer, followed by infections (50% less) which increased dramatically only in 2010 
(Biotekforum 2011). Swedish pharmaceutical SME segment looks more diverse regarding 
therapeutic areas (Swedenbio 2011). Also in Sweden the number one therapeutic area for 
clinical studies is cancer, tightly followed by CNS (Central Nervous System).  On the third 
level one finds infections, cardiovascular diseases, immunology and dermatology. Also there  
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Table 8- Influential factors in the national innovation environment in Norway and 
Sweden 
The variables Norway Sweden 
Scientific environment Norwegian Radium Hospital in Oslo is the 
scientific centre with expertise within the 
field of cancer. Several successful SMEs 
stem from academic research in this hospital  
Karolinska institute is the main scientific centre 
 
Clusters/networks in 
pharmaceutical sector 
Two national centres of expertise: Oslo 
Cancer Cluster (OCC) and Nansen 
Neuroscience Network (NNN) 
Medicon valley (predominantly Danish firms), 
Stockholm/Uppsala, Umeå, Gothenburg 
Trade associations 
 
LMI is focused on innovative 
pharmaceutical industry. Recently LMI 
strategy changed to supporting the 
innovative SMEs by focus on political 
lobbying 
SwedenBio established in 2002 to work for the 
benefit of entire life science industry in 
Sweden. Very active in political lobbying for 
the benefit of SMEs 
Avg. R&D expenditure 
per biotech firm*  
0.9 millions PPP $ 4.1 millions PPP $ 
Biotech R&D 
expenditure by firm size 
** 
< 50 employees: 60 % (102 firms) 
50-249 employees: 35% (48 firms) 
> 250 employees: 40% (23 firms) 
< 50 employees: 10% (45 firms) 
50-249 employees: 30% (36 firms) 
> 250 employees: 60% (32 firms) 
% Biotech to total R&D 
expenditures ** 
7.5% 5.4% 
VC investments in life 
science as the percentage 
of GDP in 2007 ** 
0.008 
Well below OECD average 
0.089 
Highest in OECD   
Government funds The Norwegian Research Council (NRC) 
and Innovation Norway.  
Vinnova (Swedish innovation agency) 
established in January 2001. Many different 
actors, also regional. SwedenBIO works for 
centralizing this. Little work done beyond seed 
funds 
Government initiatives 
 
National strategy for Biotechnology, 
establishment of SIVA  (incubator), 
Industrial PhD (50% financed by the 
government) 
SciLifeLab established in 2010 (promoting 
university research), Innovationsbron 
established in 2004 (early phase investment, 
state-industry fund ownership)  
Public innovation 
facilitation initiatives 
The inventor and the University share the 
rights to the patent. Inven2 (TTO at the  
University of Oslo and Oslo University 
Hospital) evaluates and commercializes the 
inventions from these institutions 
- The inventor owns the rights to the patent 
- Karolinska Development functions as the 
TTO, Karolinska Innovations encourages 
innovation among the students and academics 
and seeks to attract external collaborators. 
Bankruptcy regulation 
and access to finance #  
Most favourable among the Nordic 
countries 
 
Weak on bankruptcy regulation, improving 
access to finance 
Tax laws SkatteFUNN since 2002: 20% reduction on 
the costs of preapproved projects 
concerning R&D activities  
25% tax break for scientists that move to 
Sweden. A system similar to the Norwegian 
SkatteFUNN is on the way 
Success stories among 
pharma SMEs 
Pronova, Photocure, Algeta, Clavis Pharma, 
PCI Biotech, Lytix Biopharma, Pharmaq 
Norway has been very little affected by the 
recent financial crisis 
Duocort (new formulation of an existing drug) 
which was sold to foreigners and disappeared. 
During 2010-2011 several firms have gone 
bankrupt probably due to the financial crisis 
***  
Cognitive variables*** - High risk takers (historically).  
- Individualists. 
- No problem if the firm or the product is 
sold to the foreigners as long as the money 
stays in the pharmaceutical business 
- Believe in incremental innovations.  
- Good at creating systems and following them 
- Paradigm shift from Big Pharma to SMEs: 
How can we build a new Astra Zeneca if the 
innovative firms and ideas move abroad? 
# Nordic entrepreneurship monitor report 2010  
* OECD science, technology and industry scoreboard 2011 
** OECD 2009 (Beuzekom and Arundel 2009) 
***Based on the interviews 
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are a large number of clinical studies in a group called “Other” including pain, osteoporosis 
and unknown. Additionally, there are several clusters in Sweden than in Norway. To 
summarize, Swedish clinical research is less focused and more diverse compared to the 
Norwegian clinical research. This might be one reason for the better success among 
Norwegian SMEs. 
4.5.3 R&D expenditure and VC investments 
The average R&D expenditure per biotech firm and VC investments within life science are 
extremely high in Sweden.  Norway, however, seems to invest a larger portion of the total 
R&D investments in biotech. Nevertheless, these factors don’t seem to explain the better 
performance of Norway regarding pharmaceutical SME’s innovative productivity and scope. 
4.5.4 Success stories and other cognitive variables 
The number of successful pharmaceutical SMEs in Norway is striking. It is worth noting that 
the majority of them either develop products within cancer therapy, or within fish/marine 
segment. Both are considered to be strong areas of expertise in Norway due to the historically 
strong research at Norwegian Radium Hospital in Oslo, and the traditional fish industry and 
marine technology.  
In Sweden, the pharmaceutical industry has been undergoing a significant transition since late 
90s. Pharmacia was sold to Pfizer in 2002 and its different units were gradually sold and 
moved out of Sweden. AstraZeneca was formed from the Swedish Astra and the British 
Zeneca in 1999. Globally, it was the fifth largest pharmaceutical company in 2009, with R&D 
headquarters in Sweden. In the recent years the company has been shutting down different 
units in Sweden and in 2012 the company announced that they also move out the R&D 
headquarters.  Thus, there is a fear that AstraZeneca will soon suffer the same destiny as 
Pharmacia and disappear from Sweden. It can be stated that the pharmaceutical environment 
in Sweden is experiencing a paradigm shift.  
There appears to be a general concern about the great effort it will take for the nation to build 
another AstraZeneca. This was repeatedly mentioned by the Swedish informants on the 
industry side and is undoubtedly due to the history of the pharmaceutical industry in the two 
countries; i.e. in Sweden people cannot picture their country without a strong pharmaceutical 
engine whereas in Norway people are used to having none. The society’s focus on the 
unbearable task of building another pharmaceutical giant might contribute to discouraging the 
SMEs who need to focus on small steps at a time. 
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All Swedish informants also were worried about the fact that the few national successful 
ideas/SMEs had been sold to foreign countries and vanished from Sweden. In Norway, only 
the informant from HoD expressed a similar concern. The informant from SwedenBIO 
expressed it in these words: 
“In general half of the investments [in the SMEs] are from government funding and 
many of these companies are sold to the US. So I am interested to hear what the 
minister of finance says about this! Swedish tax money disappears like this.” 
A Norwegian senior advisor at a venture capital investment organization within healthcare 
expressed his experience regarding licensing out the promising candidates or selling the entire 
firm to other countries with the following examples: 
“In Norway, when Nycomed-Amersham was sold to GE Healthcare for 10 billion 
NOK, Oslo Stock Exchange lost 10 billion of its value. However, not many years later, 
we have managed to create the same value by Algeta, 5 billion NOK, Clavis Pharma, 
2 billion NOK, Pronova, 2 billion NOK, plus all the other smaller ones at the sum of 
1.5 billion NOK… I was surprised when similar phenomenon did not happen in 
Sweden when Pharmacia and Astra [units] were gone. There were plenty of competent 
former employees. I was expecting that with such locomotives a new generation of 
SMEs will flourish which in sum will become as big as those giants…[In Norway] GE 
Healthcare invested 4 billion NOK in the Lindesnes plant since they took over and 
they are not moving the manufacturing out... Here is where our ambitions should be…”  
Another cognitive difference between the two countries was how much they believed in 
radical or breakthrough innovation. As the informant from Swedish SME 2 put it: 
“In my world most [progress] comes in small steps. It is very seldom something 
ground-breaking pops up… Innovation normally goes in small steps.” 
 And the informant from SwedenBIO stated: 
“There is very high risk in putting money in totally new ideas. Here in Sweden we 
need to think gradual, I think”.  
The NOMA and HoD informants were mostly in favour of supporting new breakthrough 
innovation. For the MPA informant, it did not matter who asked for the advice and what type 
of project they had.  
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4.5.5 Conclusions on other influential factors on innovative productivity and scope  
Factors that might explain the relative superiority of Norwegian innovative productivity and 
scope within the pharmaceutical SME segment are better infrastructure in government 
initiatives including tax and bankruptcy laws, more focused and less diverse therapeutic areas 
benefiting from concentrated cluster and other networks, and cognitive factors such as success 
stories among Norwegian SMEs and high risk taking attitude of Norwegians. 
Sweden has superiority regarding R&D expenditures and VC investments, both are known as 
essential inputs to innovation. However, the “output” has been low. This is known as the 
“Swedish paradox” and has been studied by several authors (Andersson et al. 2002; Ejermo 
and Kander 2006). 
A group in the Edinburgh University have analysed Swedish life science innovation strategy 
(Rosiello and Mastroeni 2010). They reported that in Sweden both government and private 
investors have become sceptical to investment in early stage SMEs within drug discovery and 
development (therapeutics) since such products are far away from market. In addition, the 
weak entrepreneurial culture and skills in Sweden were connected to the country’s industrial 
history by these authors. Although similar studies have not been performed to compare the 
situation in Norway and Sweden, the first two points (scepticism to invest in the drug 
discovery and development segment in Sweden as well as the lack of entrepreneurial culture 
due to the industrial history) can somehow explain the observed differences between 
Norwegian and Swedish SMEs’ innovative scope and productivity. 
 
4 DISCUSSION 
5.1 Summary of the main findings 
The findings indicate that Norwegian SMEs within drug discovery and development seem to 
perform better than Swedish SMEs regarding innovative scope. The innovative productivity 
among Norwegian SMEs within biopharmaceuticals seems also to be on the rise during the 
past years, whereas Swedish biopharmaceutical SMEs do not show the same trend in all 
clinical phases. Since NOMA does not actively support or facilitate innovation whereas MPA 
has an active role in supporting pharmaceutical innovation, it seems plausible that in the cases 
of these two countries, the influence of control variables (such as government funds, tax and 
bankruptcy regulations, etc.) on innovative scope and productivity are much stronger than the 
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active involvement of the national medicines agencies. Norwegian SMEs seem to seek 
scientific advice from national agencies in other European countries, including MPA, and 
regard such guidance as vital for the progress of their programs. In summary, our findings did 
neither support nor rejected the positive influence of an innovation orientated national 
medicines agency on the national SMEs innovative performance.  
The roles of NOMA and MPA are strongly influenced by institutional environment, both at 
the EU and the national level. In Sweden the EU and national forces seem to be aligned more 
or less along the same axis and direction in that both work in favour of promoting innovation 
in pharmaceutical industry. In Norway, however, the national forces appear to strongly 
moderate the influence of the EU institutional framework regarding innovation facilitation in 
pharmaceutical industry. There is no indication that NOMA has as one of its strategic goals or 
main tasks to facilitate innovation, although all informants thought that it should have had.  
NOMA’s general role seems to be the traditional control of the pharmaceutical industry. 
There is evidence that strategic resources and competences, including the vision of the 
management and their ability to take advantage of the right timing, at the time of 
establishment of EMA and/or official entrance to the EU/EEA collaboration in both countries 
have been important factors in shaping the direction and roles of the national medicines 
agencies. The findings also indicate that this may have resulted in that the two agencies have 
built their sustainable competitive advantages in completely different fields; i.e. MPA has 
selected the scientific activities, one aspect of it being guidance and support of innovative 
SMEs, whereas NOMA has selected pharmaco-economics to control the costs of (innovative) 
pharmaceuticals.  
 
5.2 Theoretical implications 
The aim of this study was to investigate the role of national medicines agency on promoting 
innovative scope and productivity of the national pharmaceutical SMEs. The results suggest 
that the initial assumption that MPA has predominantly an innovation facilitation role 
whereas NOMA has a controlling role seems to be correct. 
It was proposed (P1) that an active role of the agency in innovation facilitation will positively 
influence both the innovative scope and productivity. The findings, though, do not support 
this proposal in that the Swedish pharmaceutical SMEs seem to be less innovative in terms of 
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scope and productivity than the Norwegian ones. This result was unexpected given the 
historical success of the pharmaceutical industry in Sweden and the active innovation 
facilitation role of MPA. We have discussed that this is due to the stronger influence of the 
control variables in the model, which seem to be different in the two countries. In Norway 
there seems to be a better infrastructure in government initiatives including tax and 
bankruptcy laws, more focused and less diverse therapeutic areas benefiting from 
concentrated cluster and other networks, and cognitive factors such as success stories among 
Norwegian SMEs and high risk taking attitude of Norwegians. “National systems of 
innovation” may be used as a collective term for this kind of national environmental variables 
encompassing government (economic) policies, industrial relations, cultural aspects, etc. 
(Freeman 1995; Lundvall et al. 2002). The literature on national systems of innovation within 
the field of biotechnology and pharmaceuticals is rich (Laursen 1996; Casper and Matraves 
2003; Kaiser and Prange 2004).  There is little doubt that such factors will have a tremendous 
influence on innovative productivity and scope of national pharmaceutical start-up firms. In 
fact, national medicines agencies may become a part of the national systems of innovation due 
to the knowledge spillover effect described earlier. In a future research it would be interesting 
to investigate the different roles of national medicines agencies in countries where most of 
such factors in their national systems of pharmaceutical innovation are similar. Since this is 
not the case for Norway and Sweden, it is not easy to conclude on this one factor alone. In 
addition, Norwegian SMEs actively seek advice and guidance from other countries’ national 
medicines agencies. This confirms that national medicines agencies do have an important role 
in positively influencing the innovative scope and productivity of national and foreign SMEs. 
This means that the first proposal (P1) is neither supported nor rejected by the findings. 
The perceived roles of NOMA and MPA by the national industrial actors have contributed to 
different attitudes towards these two national agencies. In Sweden, MPA seems to be 
perceived as a discussion partner with a low threshold to contact, and an authority who is 
interested in the success of the SMEs. In Norway, the predominant controlling role of NOMA 
and the organization’s passive role in innovation facilitation has resulted in that the 
Norwegian SMEs turn to other countries’ national medicines agencies, including MPA, when 
they need guidance. Apart from being impractical as well as time and resource consuming for 
SMEs, this also means that NOMA does not have much influence, and quite limited 
knowledge, on the pharmaceutical innovative activities at the national level. This also means 
that NOMA is most probably not acting as a supporting organization in terms of knowledge 
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spillover for the national SMEs or academic research centres, and is losing the chance to 
strengthen its competence and actively contribute to the national scientific and innovative 
arena. As explained throughout this thesis, national medicines agencies are in possession of 
knowledge that can facilitate pharmaceutical innovation through guidance of the actors how 
to do the right things first time to avoid wasting time and resources. In Norway, where 
innovation in the health sector has become one of the national priorities, it is quite unfortunate 
that the innovative organizations and SMEs cannot take advantage of NOMA’s knowledge in 
the best possible way.       
The present study also aimed at investigating the influence of institutions and the strategic 
resources on shaping the role of the two national medicines agencies.  
The findings seem to confirm that institutional environment at both EU and national level has 
had significant influence on the role of the national medicines agencies in innovation 
facilitation (proposition 2). As discussed in depth in section 4.3, in Sweden the EU forces 
seem to be mostly in the same direction as the national forces; i.e. innovation and industry 
orientation. In Norway, the national environment appears to be more in conflict with EU’s 
innovation and industry orientation. 
The impact of the strategic resources (management, timing, competences) in selecting the role 
by the national agencies also seemed to be supported by the observations (propositions 3a). 
However, there appears to be evidence that the relationship between the strategic resources 
and the role of the agency is a type of circular/cumulative causation. In the business literature 
“Circular causation is a common situation in complex systems (with several interconnected 
causes and effects) where an action is controlled or affected by its own outcome or result” 
(BusinessDictionary.com). In other words, existence of certain type of competence reinforces 
itself; i.e. when an organisation decides to strengthen an existing area of competence it will in 
turn attract people having high levels of that specific type of competence. There is evidence in 
the literature that cumulative causation is one of the crucial characteristics of the RBV (Foss 
1998). Proposition 3a is therefore suggested to be revised to reflect this finding. 
Revised proposition 3a: The type and level of competencies of strategic human resources 
at the national medicines agency will influence the role of the agency with respect to 
innovation facilitation. The role of the agency has in turn a positive influence on further 
building up the strategic competencies. 
53 
 
Proposition 3b seems to be fully supported by the observations. The management’s 
recognition of the level of existing competencies and their decision on what competences to 
strengthen in the time window following a significant institutional change has been crucial to 
the different roles of the national medicines agencies. MPA decided to build up the scientific 
competence, mostly thanks to the visionary GD who had a scientific background and was a 
member of CHMP. At NOMA, on the other hand, the GD at the time of the establishment of 
EMA had the vision to reduce NOMA’s scientific activities. In addition, the former head of 
pharmaco-economic department at NOMA moved to the ministry (HoD) as the head of the 
unit which endorses NOMA’s budgets and annual plans. It should probably not be surprising 
that NOMA rather built up the competence within pharmaco-economics. 
The outcomes of the study do not completely match with the proposed theoretical framework. 
Thus the modifications to the framework, presented in Figure 4, seem to be necessary. 
Figure 4- Modified theoretical framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3 Practical implications 
One of the findings of this thesis is the indirect influence of a high-income-generating 
innovative national pharmaceutical industry in shaping the role of the national medicines 
agency with respect to innovation facilitation. It appears that when such industry is large 
enough to play an important role in the national economy, their needs will be recognized by 
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the government. As such, it can be suggested that existence of a blooming innovative industry 
would strongly contribute to shaping the role of the national medicines agency towards 
innovation facilitation through the influence on national institutional environment. As one key 
NOMA informant stated: 
“I am really not sure if it is a national medicines agency’s facilitating role and 
attitude that contributes to more innovation, or is it a dynamic innovative 
pharmaceutical industry that forces the agency to take such a role? It is the hen and 
the egg dilemma…”  
The interviews revealed that not all Norwegian pharmaceutical SMEs have ideas on how to 
use their own national medicines agency since they seek advice in other European countries. 
This is in contrast to the Swedish SMEs who took it for granted that they can use MPA as a 
discussion counterpart, both formally and informally. Both Norwegian SME informants and 
the LMI informant mentioned that having access to an innovation oriented and more visible 
national agency was highly beneficial. NOMA has yet to position itself with this regard and 
become more visible to the industrial customers. 
As explained above, lack of national innovative and income generating Big Pharma in 
Norway has most probably contributed to the controlling role of NOMA. Nevertheless, waves 
of change with regard to national institutional forces seem to be on the rise, which might have 
an influence on the role of NOMA in the future: 
• The historically unmatched increasing number of innovative (bio) pharmaceutical SMEs, 
forcing the politicians to recognize their potential of bringing income after the age of oil. 
• The global consciousness on knowledge-based economy has also influenced the society 
and the politicians in Norway, resulting in substantial initiatives and whitepapers on 
innovation. Several of those are addressed in the case study section of this thesis. 
• A 2010 study performed by European commission showed that Norwegians are among the 
most optimistic of Europeans regarding the potentials of biotechnology. This is a real 
change from the nation’s negative attitude in 1990s.   
• There are signs that Norwegian authorities are about to reconsider their focus on strict 
control. One of the key NOMA informants stated: 
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“The European system is built on trust… I think that our society as a whole is 
undergoing a transition between control and [acknowledgement of] the actor’s 
responsibility” 
• There is a concern about the decrease in the number of clinical studies in Norway (and 
other Nordic countries) and there have been (government) initiatives to improve the 
situation. NOMA can actively contribute to lower the regulatory barriers for the academia 
and SMEs. 
• All Norwegian informants, including those from NOMA and HoD, indicated that 
facilitating pharmaceutical innovation should be included in NOMA’s strategy as one of 
the main points. Several of them suggested that NOMA should more actively share its 
scientific expertise both in the international and the national arena through active guidance 
and advice. 
• Norway has achieved cost containment on pharmaceuticals. As one key informant at 
NOMA stated, now it should be time for strengthening the scientific assessment area and 
focus on scientific advice for the benefit of national industry.  
• Several members of NOMA’s top management and many other employees in different 
units of NOMA are in favour of innovation facilitation (author’s own experience), mostly 
thanks to the one top manager who recently brought this vision to the organization.  
What does all this mean for NOMA? Is this another time-window of opportunity? Shouldn’t 
HoD and NOMA be interested in taking a role in the national efforts regarding innovation 
facilitation and actively contribute? How can NOMA actively take part in building up a 
knowledge-based pharmaceutical industry in Norway?  
One purpose of this study is to provide practical implications for NOMA in order to be able to 
meet the needs of its industrial customers. Several recommendations grounded on the 
interviews regarding the SME’s needs as well as the informants’ experiences follows: 
1. National SMEs as well as academic research centres need active information, 
guidance and advice in order to do the right things the first time and, if necessary, to 
change the course early on. Otherwise they will waste valuable time and resources 
which is vital for their existence.   
The need of both SMEs and academic research centres for NOMA’s guidance is first and 
foremost related to scientific and regulatory guidance and how to obtain the necessary 
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permissions for manufacturing and import of the product for clinical studies. However, too 
much focus on starting the clinical studies in order to attract more financing may result in that 
SMEs lose their perspective on what they are developing and who will be interested to pay for 
it (LMI informant). Recently, all national authorities are becoming increasingly demanding 
regarding the health-economic requirements meaning that new MPs should bring real 
therapeutic benefit in order to get a high maximum price and be reimbursed. Therefore there 
is also a need to guide the developers on what type of products are needed and what studies to 
run in order to demonstrate the superiority of their product compared to the existing 
treatments. According to the LMI informant, it is increasingly popular for the European 
authorities to give this type of advice already in early phases of development. MPA invites 
TLV for such joint meetings at the request of the firms.  
Having both scientific and the pharmaco-economic units in the same organization, NOMA 
can clearly benefit from mutual competence building between the assessment and the 
pharmaco-economic units.  Through offering such joint meetings to SMEs, NOMA will be 
able to significantly contribute both to their innovative scope and innovative productivity.  
2. Would Norwegian pharmaceutical SMEs perform even better if NOMA had an 
active role in innovation facilitation?  
Norwegian SMEs seek advice at other European national medicines agencies. So their need 
for such guidance is not only confined to the formal scientific advice procedures through 
EMA. SMEs use the more informal scientific and regulatory advice at national medicines 
agencies to prepare for the more formal and time-consuming one at EMA. For the Norwegian 
SMEs, lack of access to a more innovation-oriented medicines agency in Norway means 
limited access to informal discussions, more preparations for more formal meetings and more 
wasted time on travelling. Consequently, if NOMA had an active role regarding innovation 
facilitation, Norwegian SMEs would have probably worked even faster and more effective.  
Nevertheless, the effect of a passive role of NOMA may be more serious for the academic 
research centres since they do not have any understanding or knowledge of the regulatory 
requirements for the MP development. As described elsewhere in the thesis, national 
medicines agencies may act as supporting organization, contributing to the entire national 
innovation environment through knowledge spillover; i.e. lessons learned from SMEs and 
larger pharmaceutical firms can be transferred to the academia. 
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One of the first steps in the direction of innovation facilitation and provision of scientific 
advice is that NOMA actively attends in EMA’s SAWP. This aims at strengthening NOMA’s 
scientific competence to find solutions for development challenges rather than to solely 
evaluate if the developers have done the right things by focusing on the assessment of the 
final documentations.  Parallel to this, NOMA also needs to develop its organization culture 
to a more innovation-friendly direction. Arranging regular information and educational 
meetings for the SMEs and academia should become one of the major tasks for several 
functions and units at NOMA. 
3. SMEs needs for information and guidance is on a more basic level than Big 
Pharma’s needs. 
To address this need, NOMA could build a national SME office.  
This should be a low-threshold service-based office working as the first contact point. The 
SME office should be in charge of providing rapid and informal guidance and arranging 
larger information meetings in addition to informal product-specific meetings for the benefit 
of both SMEs and academic researchers. One way of actively providing information and 
education of the academic actors and SMEs is to use so-called “nodes” to bring this forward. 
Examples of such nodes can be research departments at the hospitals.  
4. NOMA’s strategy should encompass innovation facilitation as one of its main goals.  
To be able to achieve the above mentioned goals, innovation facilitation must be included in 
NOMA’s strategy as one of the main points. Otherwise, this will not be prioritized.  
Not only NOMA, but also HoD needs to recognize NOMA’s responsibility and tasks 
regarding innovation facilitation. A more holistic innovation and industry development policy 
is required through better communication and collaboration between NHD, HoD and the 
ministry of education and research. In Sweden, SwedenBIO has taken initiative for such a 
meeting between the three ministries resulting in formation of a group at the ministry of trade 
to develop the project further (SwedenBio informants). 
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5.4 Limitations of the study and future research 
The author is currently employed at NOMA and has earlier been working in one of the 
successful Norwegian pharmaceutical SMEs. This is probably one of the reasons for 
somehow skewed analysis towards more weight on the Norwegian situation.  
Selection of the informants and secondary data has been significantly influenced by the focus 
of the study on innovation in the national SMEs. Since MPA is innovation-oriented, none of 
the informants gave a hint on any controversial role or the resisting institutional forces in 
Sweden. Possibly, the outcome would have been different had an informant been selected 
from other segments such as pharmacy, prescribers, etc. The same type of limitation applies to 
NOMA. Since NOMA has not been active in innovation facilitation, the controversial and 
overall negative results mostly reflect this aspect, and not NOMA’s role on other important 
tasks of the agency. The controversial responses and facts is the main reason for more weight 
on analysis of the Norwegian situation.  
There are several interesting suggestions for further research in this area.  
First of all, the study was not able to give an answer to the main research question about the 
effect of the innovation facilitation role of the national medicines agencies on the innovative 
scope and productivity of national SMEs, most probably because of the strong influence of 
the control variables being different in the two countries of Norway and Sweden. We 
suggested that such control variables are indicative of the national innovation system. A 
future research on this subject should be done by comparing the agencies in countries that are 
more similar with respect to the national innovation systems. It can also be suggested to study 
the roles of national medicines agencies with the perspective of them being a part of the 
national innovation system. 
If NOMA decides to change its focus and role towards innovation facilitation, a longitudinal 
case study of NOMA can be suggested to investigate how a regulatory organization is able to 
change its focus from controlling the industry to acting more as an innovation supporting 
organization. Such study can also monitor the effect of this change of role on the Norwegian 
SME’s productivity and scope in the longer run. 
The most surprising finding in the study was that Norwegian pharmaceutical SMEs within 
drug discovery and development are in a better position than those in Sweden. It is necessary 
to emphasize that the results reflect only a “snapshot” of the situation in a limited timeframe. 
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The in depth study of this observation over time was out of the scope of this thesis and can be 
suggested as a future research. It will also be interesting to investigate the differences between 
the two countries in other pharmaceutical segments such as diagnostics and medical devices. 
 
5 CONCLUSION 
The main objective of the study was to better understand the role of national medicines 
agencies in promoting innovation within national (bio) pharmaceutical SMEs, by studying the 
case of Norway and Sweden.  
The main research question and the related sub-questions to be answered were: 
5. What role do national medicines agencies play in promoting the innovative scope and 
productivity of the pharmaceutical innovation performed by SMEs in their own countries? 
a. How can national medicines agencies facilitate and contribute to (bio) 
pharmaceutical innovation in terms of innovative productivity and scope?   
b. How does the institutional environment of the national medicines agency influence 
its role? 
c. What strategic resources at national medicines agencies are important in 
facilitating innovation? 
d. What other factors in the national innovation environment contribute to the 
innovative productivity and scope of SMEs? 
The overall results to the main question indicate that, in case of Norway and Sweden, there 
was no direct relationship between the active innovation facilitation role of the national 
medicines agency and the innovative scope and productivity of the national 
(bio)pharmaceutical SMEs. It was concluded that the influence of other factors in the national 
innovation environment (sub-question d) were stronger than the innovation facilitation role of 
the national medicines agency. This, however, does not mean that national medicines agencies 
do not have a role in positively influencing the innovative scope and productivity of national 
actors. To the contrary, national medicines agencies can play a significant role in guiding 
SMEs and academic environments how to do the right things first time. This is supported by 
the fact that Norwegian SMEs seek advice and guidance in other European countries. In 
addition, by acting as supporting organization, national medicines agencies can contribute to 
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the entire national pharmaceutical innovation environment through knowledge spillover. 
Consequently, if NOMA had an active role regarding innovation facilitation, Norwegian 
SMEs probably would have worked even faster and more effective. 
The study described the influence of the European and national institutional environment on 
the different roles that the two agencies have taken and concluded that in Sweden the 
European and national institutional forces seem to be aligned along the same axis and both 
work in the same direction of contribution to innovation, while in Norway the national 
institutional forces strongly moderate the influence of the EU’s institutional framework 
resulting in NOMA’s predominantly controlling role on the pharmaceutical industry (sub-
question b). 
We also demonstrated the evidence that strategic resources and competences, including the 
vision of the management and their ability to take advantage of the right timing at the time of 
establishment of EMA and/or official entrance to the EU/EEA collaboration in both countries 
have probably been important factors in selection of the roles and building their sustained 
competitive advantages in completely different fields (sub-question c). 
The “practical implications” section addresses the “sub-question a” with several suggestions 
on how it is possible for NOMA to contribute actively to innovative productivity and scope of 
the national SMEs. 
The time has long passed when a pharmaceutical company could perform all stages of product 
discovery and development on its own. Today’s complex medical challenges and scientific 
progress demand an entire network of collaborations to deliver new therapies. In the context 
of development of a knowledge-based industry for a future sustainable national economy, the 
important role of a national medicines agency cannot and should not be underestimated. 
Further study in this area, as elaborated in the discussion part, is therefore recommended. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A- List of SMEs in Norway and Sweden involved in Drug discovery and 
development 
Norway: 
Affitech research, Algeta, APIM Therapeutics, Algipharma, Avexxin, BerGenBio, Biolink, 
Bionor Pharma, Biosergen, Biothec Pharmacon, Clavis Pharma, Lytix Biopharma, Nordic 
Nanovector, PCI Biothec, Pharmaq, Photocure, Pronova Biopharma, SantoSolve, Serodus, 
siRNAsense, Targovax, Vaccibody. 
 
Sweden: 
Active Biotech, Adenovir Pharma, Affibody, Albiero, Allenex, Alligator Bioscience, Aprea, 
Athera Biotechnologies, Avaris, Axcentua Pharmaceuticals, Axongen, Betagenon, BioArctic 
Neuroscience, BioInvent International, Camurus, Cantargia, Cardoz, Cebix, Chemilia, 
Chrontech pharma, Creative Antibodies Sweden, Dermagen, Dyamid Medical, Dilafor, Eribis 
Pharmaceuticals, Essentys, Eurocine vaccines, Glucox Biothec, Hansa Medical, Imed, 
Immunicum, Index Pharmaceuticals, Isifer, Kancera, Karo Bio, Laccure, Lidds, Mivac, 
NeuroNova, NeuroVive Pharmaceuticals, NovaSAID, Oasmia Pharmaceuticals, Omnio 
Healer, OncoPeptides, Oxthera, Oxypharma, Pergamum, Pharmalink, PharmaSurgics, 
PledPharma, Premacure, Redoxis, Respiratorius, SentoClone, TikoMed, Umecrine Mood, 
Vicore, WntResearch, Ximmune, Isconova, Medivir, Simplexia. 
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